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  INTRODUCTION   
The role of justice in assigning criminal liability and pun-
ishment has been a mainstay of philosophical, legal, and policy 
debate for centuries. Most of the past century’s debate has used 
a philosophical concept of justice, drawn from the reasoned 
analysis of moral philosophers. Some more recent writings, 
however, have urged that there might be good reason to rely 
upon a more empirical notion of justice: one reflected in the 
shared intuitions of justice of the community to be governed by 
the criminal justice system whose rules and practices are being 
formulated.1 
 
 1. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, 
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 6–7 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME] (“Greatest coopera-
tion will be elicited when the criminal law’s liability rules correspond with the 
community’s views of justice.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Util-
ity of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457–58 (1997) (arguing that the power of 
the criminal justice system to influence conduct is rooted in its moral credibil-
ity, and that deviations from community norms of desert detracts from this 
credibility by creating perceptions that the system is unfair). For a discussion 
of the difference between philosophical and empirical desert, see Paul H. Rob-
inson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and 
Empirical (Feb. 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Competing Conceptions]; Paul H. Robinson, The Role of 
Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and Empirical 
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But many writers, including many sympathetic to the im-
portance of doing justice—that is, of distributing punishment 
according to a robust assessment of an offender’s blameworthi-
ness—see desert as a vague concept on which there is much 
disagreement.2 One line of writers articulates a related but 
slightly different objection: It is not that desert is too vague to 
have any meaning or that people necessarily disagree about 
what desert means. Rather, they argue, the notion of desert has 
discernible content but content that provides guidance only as 
to the outer limits of appropriate punishment. It can identify 
injustice and failures of justice—outer boundaries that should 
not be crossed—but cannot specify a punishment that should be 
imposed.3 
Because, until recently, the traditional defense of a desert 
distribution of punishment has been philosophical, there has 
been little effective response to such attacks regarding specific-
ity, vagueness, and disagreement. Indeed, the disagreements 
among the desert-supporting philosophers themselves only 
seem to illustrate the validity of the criticisms.4 But when an 
empirical conception of desert is adopted, the claims of vague-
ness and disagreement are matters subject to empirical testing. 
Do lay persons have specific intuitions of justice, specific 
enough to reliably distinguish among a variety of cases? Or, 
does the empirical conception of desert have hopelessly vague 
content or does it specify only matters of outer limits of proper 
punishment, such that it cannot be the basis for constructing a 
workable criminal justice system? Even if the empirical notion 
of desert has meaningful and specific content, is that meaning 
so different among different persons that, again, it could not be 
used to construct a workable criminal justice system? In other 
words, are there shared intuitions of justice? 
 
Desert (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 06-39 (2007)), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933692. 
 2. See infra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 4. See, e.g., MARK TUNICK, PUNISHMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 107 
(1992): 
From our account of theorists commonly called retributivists it is 
clear that there is no distinct set of criteria the satisfaction of which is 
essential for meriting that label. . . . 
  The retributivist label, then, might not seem particularly useful, 
for the differences on particular issues among some retributivists may 
seem greater than the differences between some retributivists and 
some utilitarians. 
Id. 
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Parts I and II of this Article seek to answer these questions 
by examining previously existing research done in this and 
other countries. Part III reports the results of a new set of stud-
ies that attempted to find the limits of agreement concerning 
the core wrongs with which criminal law concerns itself. Fi-
nally, Part IV examines areas in which there are true dis-
agreements among people’s intuitions of justice. It also exam-
ines the reasons why the level of agreement that does exist may 
be obscured from the view of the casual observer, creating a 
false impression of disagreement. 
The picture that emerges is quite striking: Intuitions of 
justice among laypersons exist on a wide variety of liability and 
punishment issues. They are quite nuanced, no matter a per-
son’s level of education. They produce specific directions re-
garding deserved punishment, not simply broad generalities or 
outer limits. And there is a good deal of agreement on intui-
tions of justice regarding a wide range of liability and punish-
ment issues and across all major demographics. 
I.  ARE LAY INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE SPECIFIC?   
Writers commonly criticize what they see as the “vague-
ness of desert.”5 
[E]veryone may agree that five years in prison is unjustly harsh de-
sert for shoplifting, or that a five dollar fine is unjustly lenient desert 
for rape, but beyond such clear cases our intuitions seem to fail us. Is 
two years, five years, or ten years the proper sanction for a rape? . . . 
Our sense of just deserts here seems to desert us.6 
 
 5. See, e.g., BERNARD BOSANQUET, SOME SUGGESTIONS IN ETHICS 188, 
203 (1918) (“There is no estimate which can determine degrees of moral guilt 
in actual individual cases. Such a thing is wholly inconceivable.” (emphasis 
omitted)); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUB-
LICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179 (1990) (“The vagueness of desert . . . 
masks mistakes.”); R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Phi-
losophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 8 (1996) (“It is not enough simply 
to appeal to the supposedly shared intuition that the guilty deserve to suf-
fer . . . since such an intuition, however widely shared, needs explanation: 
what do they deserve to suffer, and why?” (citation omitted)). 
 6. Leo Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 80, 80–81 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). Similarly, it is ob-
served: 
Perhaps, at best, retributivism can determine the roughly appropriate 
punishment by comparatively ranking offenses in such a way as mur-
der warrants greater punishment than rape, which warrants greater 
punishment than armed robbery, and so on. But it cannot determine 
whether rape warrants twenty, thirty, forty years imprisonment. 
Though retributivism cannot set cardinal or absolute levels of pun-
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Further, it is argued, even if theoretically there was a 
meaningful concept of desert, it simply would be impossible to 
operationalize it with sufficient specificity: 
Insofar as we seek a morally sensitive scale in which to weigh subjec-
tive guilt, to classify the individual criminal on the long continuum 
from unblemished virtue to unmitigated evil . . . . [t]he criminal law is 
unfitted for such issues. It faces an adequacy of difficulties without 
addressing such ethical nuances. It is necessarily generalized rather 
than related to the moral quality of the specific act. . . . 
  Questions of guilt will thus be weighed on the imprecise scales of 
the criminal law which can allow for only a few subjective qualifica-
tions to the objective gravity of the crime.7 
 
ishment, its advocates insist that they can set ordinal, or relative, 
levels of punishment (for example, murder warrants greater punish-
ment than larceny). But retributivism cannot even satisfactorily de-
termine degrees of punishment ordinally. For example, even if we as-
sume that, all other things being equal, murder warrants greater 
punishment than armed robbery, does negligent homicide warrant 
greater punishment than intentional rape or intentional armed rob-
bery? Retributivism has no answer. This is the serious flaw in Kant’s 
lex talionis and even G.W.F. Hegel’s more sophisticated version. Both 
fail to take into account differing culpability levels stemming from the 
various levels of mens rea or mental states that accompany the com-
mission of wrongdoing. Retributivism has no answer to the issue of 
whether greater wrongdoing done with lower culpability (for example, 
negligence or recklessness) warrants more or less punishment than 
comparatively minor wrongdoing with a greater level of culpability 
(such as intention or purpose). Thus, retributivism can determine nei-
ther the ordinal nor the cardinal ranking of crimes and their concomi-
tant degrees of punishment. 
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Pun-
ishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 893 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 7. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 74 (1974). Other 
writers have expressed similar views in different terms: 
Norms are necessarily stated in general terms, in the sense of apply-
ing to classes of circumstances, defined fairly generally. Accordingly, 
there are many opportunities for disagreement to arise among mem-
bers of a society over whether a norm is applicable in a specific cir-
cumstance. For example, it is likely that virtually all Americans hold 
that rape is prohibited behavior, but whether a specific instance of 
sexual intercourse is definable as rape may be unclear because the 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable means of persuasion 
is not fixed. Indeed, a large part of the work of our legal system con-
sists of making determinations of whether and how legal norms apply 
to specific instances of behavior. Accordingly, by the very nature of 
norms, we can expect greater consensus about them when they are 
stated in general terms and lesser consensus over the application of 
the norms to specific instances of behavior. In the present instance, 
we can expect more agreement among Americans about which crimes 
deserve harsher punishments but less agreement about the specific 
sentences to be imposed. 
PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDE-
LINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 2–3 (1997). 
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Some writers may be willing to concede that desert has 
some meaning, but argue that it cannot specify a particular 
amount of punishment that is deserved; it can only identify 
what is a seriously disproportionate punishment. Indeed, this 
is the underlying assumption of the American Law Institute’s 
recent proposal for a revised Model Penal Code Section 
1.02(2)(a), setting out the purposes of the sentencing provisions 
and the principles governing their interpretation and applica-
tion:8 
Subsection (2)(a) embraces Morris’s observation that moral intuitions 
about proportionate penalties in specific cases are almost always 
rough and approximate—and that most people experience them as 
such. Even when a decisionmaker is acquainted with the circum-
stances of a particular crime, and has a rich understanding of the of-
fender, it is seldom possible, outside of extreme cases, for the deci-
sionmaker to say that the deserved penalty is precisely x. In Morris’s 
phrase, the “moral calipers” possessed by human beings are not suffi-
ciently fine-tuned to reach exact judgments of condign punishments. 
Morris postulated instead that most people’s moral sensibilities, con-
cerning most crimes, will orient them toward a range of permissible 
sanctions that are “not undeserved.” Outside the perimeters of the 
range, some punishments will appear clearly excessive to do justice, 
and some will appear clearly too lenient—but there will nearly always 
be a substantial gray area between the two extremes. 
 
Although there may be little difficulty in making uniform judgments 
of ordinal culpability (e.g., his killing was more culpable than her kill-
ing, because she was provoked and he wasn’t) or of ordinal harmful-
ness (e.g., her theft was more harmful than his, because she stole 
their car and he stole their typewriter), there is no unique non-
arbitrary way to combine these judgements into one judgement of or-
dinal seriousness. 
Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 
601, 613 (1978). 
 8. The text of the proposal provides: 
§ 1.02(2). Purposes; Principles of Construction. 
(2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing are: 
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders: 
(i) to render sentences within a range of severity proportion-
ate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime vic-
tims, and the blameworthiness of offenders; 
(ii) in appropriate cases, to achieve offender rehabilitation, 
general deterrence, incapacitation, and restoration of crime 
victims and communities, provided these goals are pursued 
within the boundaries of sentence severity permitted in sub-
section (a)(i); and 
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to 
achieve the applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and 
(ii) . . . 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Sentencing Discussion Draft No. 1, 2006). 
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  Subsection 1.02(2)(a)(i) codifies Morris’s conception of an ap-
proximate retributive ballpark when it speaks of a “range of severity” 
of proportionate punishments. Subsection 2(a)(ii) makes further ref-
erence to the idea of a permissive range when it refers to “the 
boundaries of sentence severity permitted in subsection (a)(i).”9 
Part of the confusion here is a mistaken notion by some 
that desert associates some absolute amount of punishment 
with a particular offense. Modern desert theorists make no 
such claim and have no need to do so. They argue that desert 
requires that punishment be proportional to an offender’s per-
sonal blameworthiness.10 That is, desert does require a specific 
amount of punishment, not because there is some magical con-
nection between that offense and that amount of punishment, 
but rather because that amount of punishment is the amount 
needed to set the offender in his appropriate relative position 
on the continuum of deserved punishment. In other words, 
modern notions of desert are ordinal rather than cardinal. If 
the continuum of punishment is altered—for example, some so-
cieties permit the death penalty and others do not, some use 
long prison terms while others do not—then desert would dis-
tribute punishment differently. Desert demands only that each 
person’s offense be punished according to the person’s relative 
degree of personal blameworthiness. There is nothing in desert 
theory that demands a particular, higher or lower, end point on 
the continuum of punishment. Desert primarily concerns itself 
with the relative difference in blameworthiness among cases.11 
But it may still be argued that even this blameworthiness 
ranking of offenses is beyond the ability of people’s intuitions of 
justice, that those intuitions are simply too vague to do more 
than to roughly distinguish between “serious” cases and “less 
 
 9. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. b; see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in 
Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 365–70 (1997) (summarizing Nor-
val Morris’s limiting retributivist theory of punishment in which desert dic-
tates upper and lower limits of punishment, but general deterrence, considera-
tions of equality, and parsimony provide “fine-tuning”). 
 10. JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 114 (1973) (“What follows 
from [attempts to exactly define desert] is not the absurdity of specific desert 
claims but only the absurdity of expecting them to function like statements of 
empirical quantity.”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DE-
SERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 39–46 
(1985) (“Desert should be treated as a determining principle in deciding ordi-
nal magnitudes.”). 
 11. A popular attack on desert is to ignore this character of modern desert 
and to insist that it demands a particular amount of punishment and, further, 
that it demands harsh punishment. Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra 
note 1 (manuscript at 11–13, 18–21). 
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serious” cases and cannot provide the kind of nuance needed to 
construct a workable criminal justice system. As Justice 
Stephen Breyer explains in his opposition to basing the United 
States Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guidelines on de-
sert: 
The “just deserts” approach would require that the Commission list 
criminal behaviors in rank order of severity and then apply similarly 
ranked punishments proportionately. For example, if theft is consid-
ered a more serious or harmful crime than pollution, then the thief 
should be punished more severely than the polluter. . . . 
  [T]he Commission soon realized that only a crude ranking of be-
havior in terms of just deserts, based on objective and practical crite-
ria, could be developed. . . . 
  [T]hose who advocated “just deserts” . . . could not produce a con-
vincing, objective way to rank criminal behavior in detail . . . .12 
 
 12. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1988) (foot-
notes omitted). For other writers arguing that crimes cannot be rank ordered, 
see, for example, David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1623, 1638–39 (1992). Commissioner Paul H. Robinson argued, in re-
sponse, that the Commission’s compromise approach left the guidelines with 
no coherent underlying principle and, not surprisingly, internally incoherent 
in directions. See Paul H. Robinson, Dissent from the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s Proposed Guidelines, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1112, 1113–
16 (1986): 
Neither of the Commission’s guidelines was drafted with a coherent, 
articulated sentencing philosophy in mind. Rather, the drafting was 
done in an ad hoc manner without the guidance of any set of sentenc-
ing principles. The inevitable result of this approach is guidelines 
that are haphazard and internally inconsistent, and that frequently 
generate improper results; they simply do not consistently and ra-
tionally distinguish cases according to relevant offense and offender 
characteristics. 
  A comparison of possible guideline sentences for different offenses 
illustrates one difficulty. Is it appropriate that the sentence for ag-
gravated fish smuggling can be greater than that for armed bank rob-
bery? that the sentence for aggravated forcible sexual contact with a 
13-year-old child can be less that [sic] that for submitting a false re-
cord on protected wildlife? that the sentence for some antitrust viola-
tions can be less than that for failure to surrender a naturalization 
certificate? that the sentence for involuntary manslaughter can be 
less than that for impersonating a government employee? that the 
sentence for inciting a riot can be less than that for altering a motor 
vehicle ID number? The fact of the matter is that the Commission 
never systematically ranked offenses. . . . 
  While the proposed draft obviously does not generate peculiar re-
sults in all cases, it is all too easy to find difficulties like those noted 
above. The true significance of these examples is not the particular 
problems that they present, but rather that they manifest an unsys-
tematic approach to the complex task of guideline drafting. It is an 
approach that has produced a flawed structure and drafting of mixed 
quality. 
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The average state criminal code distinguishes a dozen 
grades of offenses.13 Modern sentencing guidelines make even 
more distinctions.14 Are lay intuitions of justice nuanced 
enough to distinguish among cases with this level of specificity 
or more? Or, do they suggest only broad categories?15 
A. CATEGORIZATION STUDIES 
 A common measure of whether a person makes nuanced 
judgments is the number of distinctions she makes in her 
judgments. In studies in which subjects are given categories 
into which to sort offenses, they in fact use most or all of the 
categories. Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, for example, 
asked raters to evaluate the seriousness of violations using a 
scale ranging from 1 (least serious) to 11 (most serious), with 
instructions that “[e]ach of the eleven categories is an equal 
step on the scale.”16 Monica Walker surveyed 650 individual 
residents of Sheffield, England and forty first-year sociology 
 
Id. 
 13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-601 (2001) (distinguishing six 
categories of felonies, three categories of misdemeanors, and one category of 
petty offense); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104 (2006) (listing six felony catego-
ries, three misdemeanor categories, and two petty offense categories); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4704 to -4708 (1995) (showing ten felony categories, divided 
into “drug” and “nondrug” offenses, and three misdemeanor categories); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 28-105 to -106 (1995) (listing eight felony categories and seven 
misdemeanor categories). 
 14. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines represent the far end of this spec-
trum, with forty-three offense levels. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5A (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/gl2006.pdf. 
 15. See MORRIS, supra note 7, at 31–33. The psychological literature on 
“categorical perception” provides an example of how Morris’ categorization-
only intuitions might work. Consider the perception of phonemes, small units 
of linguistic sounds such as “ba” and “pa.” Careful experimentation has shown 
that what distinguishes these sounds in spoken language is “voice onset time,” 
a continuous variable—a variable that can take on an arbitrarily large num-
ber of values. Despite this fact, these sounds are perceived as either one pho-
neme or the other. In intermediate cases, listeners do not report that the pho-
neme is somewhere between the two, but simply is one or the other. This 
illustrates that there are domains in which judgments are categorical rather 
than nuanced. See Alvin M. Liberman et al., The Discrimination of Speech 
Sounds Within and Across Phoneme Boundaries, 54 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOL. 358, 358–68 (1957) (studying the discrimination of speech sounds 
within and across phoneme boundaries by having subjects listen to two sylla-
bles and indicate if the two were the same or different; syllables were identi-
fied as different more easily if they were on opposite sides of a phoneme 
boundary). 
 16. THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF 
DELINQUENCY 131, 140 (1967). 
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students, asking subjects to rank the seriousness of eleven of-
fense scenarios—such as “He steals £1 of the money and alters 
the books”—on a scale ranging from 1 to 11.17 Stephen 
Gottfredson, Kathy Young, and William Laufer similarly used 
eleven categories of “seriousness” in their survey of 159 sub-
jects.18 In all three studies, subjects used the full range or 
nearly the full range of the scale values that were available to 
them.19 
B. RANKING STUDIES 
The more nuanced people’s intuitions of justice, the easier 
it should be for people to see two cases as distinguishable. A 
variety of studies, including those reported here, asked partici-
pants to compare two or more cases or to rank cases against 
one another. We know of no instances in which subjects were 
presented with such a task and were unable to complete it. 
Walker, noted above, used the “paired comparison” method, in 
which subjects are asked to judge which in each pair of offenses 
 
 17. Monica A. Walker, Measuring the Seriousness of Crimes, 18 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 348, 348–49 (1978) (comparing relative rankings of crimes 
across social status and gender using category and ratio scales; showing that 
very serious and very trivial offenses were excluded because other studies had 
already shown substantial agreement between people with regard to these 
crimes; and also presenting evidence that the entire scale was used, even 
when the ranges of offenses were restricted—giving further evidence of nu-
anced intuitions). 
 18. Stephen D. Gottfredson et al., Additivity and Interactions in Offense 
Seriousness Scales, 17 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 26, 29 (1980). 
 19. SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 16, at 254; Gottfredson et al., supra 
note 18, at 29; Walker, supra note 17, at 349. In some cases, it is not possible 
to determine precisely which categories were used because the data were re-
ported as means rather than entire distributions. This brief review is not 
meant to imply that this limits the number of cases in which offenses were as-
signed to categories of seriousness. Other examples include a study by Don 
Gibbons, who had people evaluate twenty offenses and used categories of pun-
ishment ranging from “no punishment” to “execution.” All categories were 
used by at least some subjects. Don C. Gibbons, Crime and Punishment: A 
Study in Social Attitudes, 47 SOC. FORCES 391, 395 (1969) (detailing that only 
four of the twenty offenses yielded more than ten percent “no penalty” re-
sponses: homosexuality, consensual sex between a twenty-year-old and a six-
teen-year-old, draft evasion, and marijuana use). Likewise, Peter Rossi used a 
similar method and obtained similar results. The 140 offenses rated fell across 
essentially the entire nine-category scale. Peter H. Rossi et al., The Serious-
ness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. SOC. 
REV. 224, 230 (1974). In our search of the literature we found no cases in 
which only a narrow band of the available categories was used by subjects. 
This search includes the studies reported in Parts I, II, and VI. 
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is more serious.20 There is no evidence that participants had 
any difficulty with this task.21 
C. MAGNITUDE ESTIMATION STUDIES 
Another testing methodology—magnitude estimation—
suggests the same conclusion. In Sellin and Wolfgang’s survey 
of 575 individuals22 across Pennsylvania, subjects were asked 
to rate the seriousness of fifty-one offenses and to rate the seri-
ousness of each offense relative to a bicycle theft, which was 
given an arbitrary value of 10.23 Thus, if an offense was judged 
twice as serious as a bicycle theft, that offense would be given a 
value of 20. Subjects’ responses covered an extremely broad 
range of values covering nearly three orders of magnitude.24 
In the 1977 National Crime Survey,25 which surveyed sixty 
thousand persons across the United States, subjects were read 
vignettes of twenty-five specific criminal events26 and asked to 
rate how serious the crime was relative to a baseline offense 
(the same bicycle theft used by Sellin and Wolfgang). Not all 
subjects rated all items; a total of 204 offenses were evalu-
ated.27 Judgments of the severity of the crimes covered an ex-
tremely broad range: two and a half orders of magnitude.28 
 
 20. Walker, supra note 17, at 355. 
 21. See id. at 361. 
 22. The study included 251 students, 286 police officers, and 38 judges. 
SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 16, at 255–58. 
 23. Each subject rated the same twenty-one offenses and an additional 
thirty offenses drawn from a pool of 120 additional offenses. Id. at 255–57; see 
also id. at 268 (“The most strongly supported conclusion . . . is that all the rat-
ers . . . tended to . . . assign . . . estimations [so] that the seriousness of the 
crimes is evaluated in a similar way, without significant differences, by all the 
groups” and, further, that a “pervasive social agreement about what is serious 
and what is not appears to emerge. . . .”). 
 24. Each order of magnitude refers to an offense being ten times more se-
rious than another. Two orders of magnitude would mean that the most seri-
ous offense was considered one hundred times as serious as the least serious 
offense, and so on. See id. app. E-2 at 389–90. 
 25. See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME 
SEVERITY, at vi (1985). 
 26. For example, “A person plants a bomb in a public building. The bomb 
explodes and 20 people are killed.” Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at vi–x; see also Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sen-
tencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the Public’s View, 14 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 223, 223 (1980) (concluding that there was “considerable agree-
ment across various demographic groups on the relative severity of the sen-
tences to be imposed for different offenses, but disagreement over the absolute 
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Such vast ranges in estimates of the seriousness of different of-
fenses are not consistent with the claims that intuitions regard-
ing crime seriousness are simplistic or only generalized. 
D. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Although it seems unlikely, it is theoretically possible that 
some of the results discussed above are due not to systematic 
nuanced judgments but rather to “noise” or “guessing” on the 
part of subjects. For example, people assigning offenses to cate-
gories could assign them randomly, rather than systematically, 
making judgments only appear nuanced. There is substantial 
evidence against this possibility. If individuals were responding 
randomly, their answers would be inconsistent when they were 
asked the same question in different ways or on different occa-
sions.29 
A good example of this consistency is Walker’s paired com-
parison task. By having subjects judge which in each pair of of-
fenses is more serious, they are, in essence, answering the 
same question multiple times. If people are responding ran-
domly, there should be many cases in which A is rated more se-
riously than B, and B more than C, but C more than A. Such 
“intransitive” groupings would be evidence of random respond-
ing. However, paired comparisons yielded few intransitive 
groupings—less than five percent aggregated across the groups 
of subjects.30 This result suggests that variability in judgments 
is systematic, rather than random.31 
 
magnitude of these sentences”). 
 29. As an example, consider subjects asked to judge how “glorky”—a 
made-up term—a set of objects are. Subjects might assign arbitrary values, 
perhaps even using a wide range. However, if they came back two months 
later, they would be unable to assign the same values except by remembering 
the values they originally assigned. This procedure, referred to as test-retest, 
can be measured using an index that ranges between -1 and +1 (with 0 mean-
ing no relationship, +1 meaning perfect correspondence from time 1 to time 2, 
and -1 meaning an inverse relationship). A conceptually similar method is to 
have subjects rate the same items using different methods and compare the 
results. 
 30. See Walker, supra note 17, at 350–55 (comparing relative rankings 
and data across social status and gender, while ignoring very severe, and very 
minor sentences, category and ratio scales). 
 31. Another way to estimate inability to make discriminations is to look at 
cases in which people report “don’t know” for paired comparisons. This is a di-
rect estimate of the number of cases in which two items are below the subject’s 
ability to make a discrimination. In this case, the average number of “don’t 
knows” was three percent or less across groups. Id. 
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Similarly, some studies have subjects do the task using 
more than one method—for instance, magnitude estimation 
and assigning offenses to categories. If subjects are assigning 
answers randomly, the relationship between the results on 
these tasks should be small. In contrast, when subjects used 
multiple methods to rate offenses in the National Crime Sur-
vey,32 there was nearly perfect correspondence between tasks.33 
A second kind of evidence that people are not just guessing 
stems from the data regarding consensus. If people are simply 
guessing or assigning numbers or categories to offenses ran-
domly, there should be little consensus. In fact, as the evidence 
reviewed in the next sections documents, there is much consen-
sus. In addition, measures of variation in the assignment of of-
fenses to categories or to magnitudes should be high if people 
were simply assigning these randomly. These measures from 
the studies reviewed are much smaller than random respond-
ing would produce.34 
 
 32. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 33. See V. Lee Hamilton & Steve Rytina, Social Consensus on Norms of 
Justice: Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1117, 1128–42 
(1980) (comparing test results with the results from another task in which se-
riousness was evaluated by assigning a given offense to a set of lines, with 
longer lines corresponding to greater seriousness). 
 34. For a relevant measure of variability, see Walker, supra note 17, at 
351–53. Rossi et al., supra note 19, at 227–31, found reasonably low measures 
of variance. The values for “variance” appear relatively large in some cases, 
but this is because variance, instead of standard errors, was reported. Id. Be-
cause each value derives from at least one hundred subjects, the standard er-
ror must be one-tenth or less of the reported variance. So even when the vari-
ance is large (e.g., 7.479 for “Using LSD”), the standard error of the mean 
value must be less than 0.748. Id. at 227. 
Sellin and Wolfgang report standard errors of the mean of (logarithmi-
cally) transformed values in their study of offense seriousness. See SELLIN & 
WOLFGANG, supra note 16, at 259–73. Whether these error values are “large” 
or “small” is subjective, but they are generally between 0.01 and 0.02, which 
seems reasonably to be characterized as “small.” Id. 
Jeffrey Roth’s study with prosecutors yielded similar findings. Looking 
only at the limited list of thirteen offenses, the magnitude estimate scale 
showed over an order of magnitude of difference among offenses and striking 
similarities across jurisdictions. Jeffrey A. Roth, Prosecutor Perceptions of 
Crime Seriousness, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 232, 235 (1978). Roth re-
ported standard errors rather than variance and these were reasonably small, 
with some exceptions (e.g., “assault—no injury” showed extreme variation in 
some jurisdictions). Id. at 235, 242 (“These results are consistent with previ-
ous evidence that the crime seriousness scale is invariant with respect to a 
wide variety of geographical and personal characteristics.”). 
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E. SMALL FACTUAL CHANGES PRODUCING SIGNIFICANT 
DIFFERENCES IN LIABILITY JUDGMENTS 
Another indication of the nuanced nature of intuitions of 
justice is the fact that small factual differences among scenar-
ios produce significant differences in the amount of punishment 
that subjects think is deserved.35 The studies reported in Paul 
Robinson and John Darley’s study, Justice, Liability and 
Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law, illustrate the 
point.36 In each of eighteen studies, participants were given a 
series of scenarios that followed the same basic story but varied 
the facts in a variety of ways.37 Participants were then asked to 
give deserved liability and punishment judgments for each sce-
nario.38 Changes in responses among the scenarios could then 
be attributed to the varied facts.39 The results dramatically and 
repeatedly illustrate how small changes in facts can produce 
large differences in the punishment judged to be deserved on 
an astounding array of criminal law issues.40 
In a study concerning the objective requirements for at-
tempt liability, participants dramatically alter the liability and 
punishment they would impose according to just how far the 
actor goes toward committing a coin store robbery.41 When the 
person visits the store to plan the robbery, has a special tool 
made that he will need, and tells friends of his plan, but is 
caught before he goes to the store to rob it, his average pun-
ishment is just under two weeks,42 but if he takes the addi-
tional step of going to the store and starting work on the safe, 
his liability jumps to 1.7 years.43 If he voluntarily renounces his 
attempt before being caught, 85% or more of participants would 
impose no punishment, but if he voluntarily renounces after 
committing the offense, few would give him a defense—4% 
 
 35. These quite nuanced and sophisticated intuitions exist across demo-
graphics, and, as will be apparent in the next Part, there is a high degree of 
agreement on a wide variety of issues. See infra Part II. 
 36. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME, supra note 
1, at 50–51, 79–81, 123–25, 197–99. 
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 7–11. 
 40. Id. at 50–51, 79–81, 123–25, 155, 197–99. 
 41. Id. at 20 tbl.2.2. 
 42. Id. (scenario 3). 
 43. Id. (scenario 5). 
ROBINSON_KURZBAN_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:58:24 AM 
2007] INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 1843 
 
would allow a defense, and only 27% would allow a defense 
even if he completely undoes the harm of the offense.44 
In a study concerning objective requirements for complicity 
liability, participants dramatically alter the liability and pun-
ishment they would impose according to how much assistance 
the accomplice provides.45 The man who helps a woman in 
planning the killing of her husband by directing her to a gun 
store is given an average liability of five years, while the man 
who helps her by giving her his gun so she does not have to go 
to the store gets an average of life imprisonment.46 But if he of-
fers her his gun but she says she does not need it because she 
has already killed her husband, then 85% would impose no 
punishment.47 
Another study tests the effect of various conditions on pun-
ishment for an omission to act that results in a death.48 The 
person who fails to throw a stranger a life preserver gets pun-
ishment of seven and a half weeks, but if the person is a secu-
rity guard for the pier, his liability jumps to 3.8 years.49 
Moreover, if the person fails to jump in and save the stranger, 
knowing that sharks inhabit that body of water, 86% would 
impose no punishment.50 
In a study that examines the use of deadly force in self-
defense, most people impose no punishment if such force was 
unavoidable for defense, but impose an average punishment of 
9.6 months if the person could have safely retreated, unless the 
person is in his own house, in which case there is no punish-
ment even if the person could have safely retreated.51 If he is in 
a public place but mistakenly believes that he cannot retreat, 
then he gets no punishment.52 But if his mistake is not about 
whether he can safely retreat but about the legality of using 
deadly force in the situation, then his average punishment is 
5.8 years.53 Interestingly, most of the distinctions that partici-
 
 44. Id. (compare scenarios 3a and 5a with scenarios 6a and 6b). 
 45. Id. at 36 tbl.2.9. 
 46. Id. (compare scenarios 4 and 5). 
 47. Id. (scenario 2). 
 48. Id. at 42–43. 
 49. Id. at 45 tbl.2.12 (scenarios 1 and 3). 
 50. Id. (scenario 5). 
 51. Id. at 56 tbl.3.1 (scenarios 2, 4, and 5). 
 52. Id. (compare scenarios 4 and 7). 
 53. Id. (scenario 9). 
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pants make track criminal law doctrine, even though partici-
pants generally do not know the criminal law rules.54 
Another study examined the effect of mistake in various 
contexts.55 Where a person burns a house he thinks he just 
bought, his punishment will be 1.6 years if he disregards a risk 
that the house has not yet been legally conveyed to him (which 
turns out to be the case), but his punishment is only 4.4 months 
if the risk never occurs to him but would have occurred to the 
reasonable person.56 But if he disregards the risk that owner-
ship has not yet been conveyed to unimproved property, rather 
than to a house, then his punishment is nine months rather 
than 1.6 years.57 And if the risk that the unimproved property 
is not legally his never occurred to him but would have oc-
curred to the reasonable person, then his liability is 2.4 months 
rather than nine months.58 
Similarly, if a person has consensual intercourse with a 
partner who he knows is under the legal age, then his average 
punishment is 1.6 years, but if he believes she is over the legal 
age, but is aware of a possibility that she might not be, then his 
punishment is six months.59 If her being underage never occurs 
to him but would have occurred to the reasonable person, then 
his punishment is six days.60 If the reasonable person would 
not have thought she was underage, then he has no punish-
ment.61 
In a study concerning coercion and entrapment, a truck 
driver gets two years for voluntarily delivering drugs, but only 
4.8 months where he is coerced to make the delivery by his em-
ployer’s threat to fire him if he does not.62 But where he makes 
the delivery because his family was threatened, his punishment 
is only about four weeks.63 
 
 54. Id. at 201–15 (discussing the extent to which lay intuitions track or 
deviate from criminal law rules). 
 55. Id. at 84–96. 
 56. Id. (compare scenarios 3b and 3c). 
 57. Id. (comparing the results of scenarios 4b and 3b). 
 58. Id. (scenario 4c). 
 59. Id. (compare scenarios 6a and 6b). 
 60. Id. (scenario 6c). 
 61. Id. (scenario 6d). 
 62. Id. at 151 tbl.5.7 (scenarios 1 and 3). 
 63. Id. (scenario 2). 
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One study concerns accomplice liability for one perpetrator 
killing another during a store robbery.64 Where the accomplice 
agrees beforehand to the shooting, his punishment is thirty 
years to life when the principal shoots the store owner, but if 
the accomplice thought the principal’s gun would be unloaded, 
his liability is only 6.6 years for the owner’s death.65 And if the 
principal shoots a co-felon rather than the store owner, then 
the surviving co-felon’s punishment is only twelve months.66 
Another study examines the effect on liability and punish-
ment of different causal chains between a stabbing and a re-
sulting death.67 Where the death is immediate, the average 
penalty is life imprisonment.68 But if death results because a 
careless nurse at the hospital injects the wrong medication dur-
ing treatment, the attacker’s punishment is only 19.5 years, 
and if death results because the victim flees the attack and 
happens to be running under a construction crane when its ca-
ble breaks, then the attacker’s punishment is 10.2 years69—
about the same as it would be for an attempted murder under 
similar circumstances.70 If the victim’s death results from a 
rare allergic reaction to a common drug during treatment at 
the hospital, then the attacker’s punishment is about twenty-
six years, rather than life,71 but if death results later from an 
auto accident on the way to the hospital for post-operative 
treatment, then the attacker’s punishment is only fifteen 
years.72 
Joseph Jacoby and Francis Cullen’s study also found sub-
stantial variation in preferred punishment depending on a 
number of factors—e.g., harm caused, dollar loss, etc.—again 
supporting the view that punishment preferences are nu-
anced.73 However, it is important to note that a factor that me-
diates seriousness for one crime does not necessarily do so for 
 
 64. Id. at 169–81. 
 65. Id. at 172–73 tbl.6.3 (compare scenarios 4 and 6). 
 66. Id. (scenario 9). 
 67. Id. at 181–89. 
 68. Id. at 183 tbl.6.7 (scenario 1). 
 69. Id. (compare scenarios 5 and 7). 
 70. Id. (drawing on the results of scenario 2). 
 71. Id. (comparing the results of scenarios 1 and 4). 
 72. Id. (scenario 6). 
 73. Joseph E. Jacoby & Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of Punishment 
Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245, 
271–86 (1998). 
ROBINSON_KURZBAN_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:58:24 AM 
1846 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1829 
 
another.74 For example, the dollar amount stolen changes seri-
ousness judgments for theft, but not for theft in the context of 
rape.75 That the effect of mediating factors depends on the type 
of crime again indicates extremely nuanced intuitions. 
Changes in the characteristics of the offender also influ-
ence judgments. In a study concerning immaturity and other 
excuses, an eighteen-year-old male intentionally sets another 
boy on fire to kill him while he sleeps, getting an average pun-
ishment of 25.5 years.76 A fourteen-year-old male who does the 
same thing gets 6.2 years, and a ten-year-old gets eleven 
months.77 The adult gets on average a split between life impris-
onment and the death penalty.78 Peter Rossi similarly found 
that preferred punishments varied depending not only on the 
consequences of the crime, but also on features of the victims 
and offenders.79 
In short, the evidence from multiple testing methods sup-
ports the view that intuitions of justice are finely nuanced. 
Durham summarizes the surveys this way: “Virtually without 
exception, citizens seem able to assign highly specific sentences 
for highly specific events.”80 The conclusion suggested by the 
empirical evidence is that people take account of a wide variety 
of factors and often give them quite different effect in different 
situations. That is, people’s intuitions of justice are not vague 
or simplistic, as claimed, but rather sophisticated and complex. 
II.  IS THERE AGREEMENT AMONG PEOPLE’S 
INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE?   
Even if people have a quite nuanced notion of desert, is 
there so much disagreement about these notions that they 
could not be operationalized in a criminal code or in sentencing 
 
 74. Gottfredson et al., supra note 18, at 29–37. 
 75. Id. at 39 (“The studies described above suggest that we consider not 
only the type of offense and the amount of loss incurred (measured in dollars) 
when judging the seriousness of criminal or delinquent acts, but also the in-
teraction between the two.”). 
 76. ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME, supra note 1, 
at 139–47. 
 77. Id. at 141 tbl.5.5 (scenarios 7, 8, and 9). 
 78. Id. (scenario 1). 
 79. See Peter H. Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting the Pun-
ishment to the Crime, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 59, 60–61 (1985). 
 80. Alexis M. Durham III, Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for Crime: 
Does it Exist?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (1993). 
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guidelines? Many writers have argued that people simply dis-
agree in their notions of justice. 
For instance, Michael Tonry argues that “even assuming 
retribution in distribution is appropriate, there is a classic epis-
temological problem. How do we know how much censure, or 
‘deserved punishment,’ a particular wrongdoer absolutely de-
serves? God may know, but as countless sentencing exercises 
have shown, people’s intuitions about individual cases vary 
widely.”81 
Similarly, John Monahan concludes: 
There is . . . reason to doubt that anything like a consensus exists on 
the seriousness of criminal conduct. While there may be some agree-
ment on relative levels of harm, there appears to be great variation in 
perceptions of the absolute magnitude of harm represented by various 
criminal acts, and in either the relative or absolute level of culpability 
represented by various criminal actors.82 
 
 81. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Pol-
icy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2005). 
 82. John Monahan, The Case for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model 
of Criminal Sentencing, 5 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103, 105 (1982). Other au-
thors have made similar arguments: 
[Desert theorist John Kleinig assumes that] we can work out one sin-
gle, linear ordering of crimes, from least to most “serious.” Yet that 
scarcely seems a credible assumption. Try, for instance, to rank the 
following crimes in order of their “seriousness”: attempted residential 
burglary, trading stock on inside information, negligent vehicular 
homicide, bribing a mine-safety inspector, possessing an ounce of co-
caine, and burning a cross on the lawn of black newcomers to a previ-
ously all-white neighborhood. To view this motley assortment along a 
single dimension of “seriousness” would seem no less difficult than to 
perceive the inner logic behind the apocryphal Chinese encyclopedist 
of Jorge Luis Borges’s imagination. 
David Dolinko, supra note 12, at 1638–39 (1992). Similarly, van den Haag ar-
gues: 
[Desert theorist Andrew von Hirsch] appears to believe that the com-
parative seriousness of crimes can be determined in all cases. Not so. 
Comparative seriousness can be determined only for some crimes, and 
it does not fully determine the comparative punishment deserved. If 
rape is a crime and murder is a crime, rape-murder must be more se-
rious than either. Does rape-murder deserve the sum of the punish-
ments meted out for rape and for murder? More? Less? Even when 
crimes are nearly homogeneous, assigning seriousness is arbitrary: Is 
rape more serious than assault with a deadly weapon? Is burglary 
more serious than fraud when fraud does more harm? What about 
mishandling toxic waste? Ordinal determinations of seriousness be-
come altogether arbitrary when the seriousness of heterogeneous 
crimes must be compared. 
Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1250, 1254 (1987). 
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This view, together with the view that people can make 
only crude rankings of offenses by seriousness, has been used to 
justify important policy decisions, including the drafting of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guidelines: 
[S]ome students of the criminal justice system strenuously urged the 
Commission to follow what they call a “just deserts” approach to pun-
ishment. . . . The difficulty that arises in applying this approach is 
that different Commissioners have different views about the correct 
rank order of the seriousness of different crimes. . . . Considering the 
inherent subjectivity of such a trade-off process, the Commission soon 
realized that only a crude ranking of behavior in terms of just deserts 
. . . could be developed.83 
But the empirical evidence again presents a different pic-
ture. The previous Part has already discussed the quite nu-
anced nature of intuitions of justice. The empirical evidence 
also suggests a quite strong agreement on a wide variety of li-
ability and punishment issues across demographics. In Part II. 
A. this Article examines the most fundamental claim: that hu-
mans share an intuition that serious wrongdoing should be 
punished. Part II. B. considers the extent of the agreement on 
the relevant seriousness of different instances of wrongdoing. 
A. THE INTUITION THAT SERIOUS WRONGDOING SHOULD BE 
PUNISHED 
Using a range of techniques, previous empirical studies 
confirm a nearly universal human intuition that serious 
wrongdoing deserves punishment. 
1. Questionnaire Studies 
In much of the previous research using questionnaires, 
subjects have had an option to assign no punishment. Yet, peo-
ple overwhelmingly chose to assign punishment even though 
they could have assigned none. For example, a study by Craig 
Boydell and Carl Grindstaff gave participants the opportunity 
to indicate the penalty they believed should be applied to an of-
fense, as well as the minimum and maximum penalty applica-
ble to that offense.84 For the least serious offense they investi-
gated, a mere four percent of respondents indicated that the 
 
 83. Breyer, supra note 12, at 15–17. 
 84. Craig L. Boydell & Carl F. Grindstaff, Public Opinion Toward Legal 
Sanctions for Crimes of Violence, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 113, 113, 116 
(1974) (“With regard to crime . . . and particularly crimes against the person, it 
may be that there exists a common denominator such as fear . . . that obscures 
the socio-demographic interests that normally are important.”). 
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minimum penalty they would apply is “no punishment.”85 For 
all other crimes, “no punishment” was chosen as the appropri-
ate penalty, the maximum penalty, and the minimum penalty 
by less than four percent of the respondents.86 Indeed, in the 
majority of cases, “no punishment” was selected by no partici-
pants, even as the minimum punishment for the offense.87 
Similarly, a 1985 study allowed people to indicate zero in 
their magnitude estimation task when questioned about the 
appropriate punishment for certain offenses.88 The frequency of 
zeros is not reported but the average value assigned for even 
the offense judged least serious—“a person under 16 years old 
plays hooky from school”—was statistically different from 
zero.89 On average, then, across all regions investigated, even 
the least serious offense was judged to deserve some punish-
ment.90 
In studies in which “no liability” was not an option—the 
majority of studies reviewed here—it is clear that the experi-
menter assumed that all subjects would believe that all acts 
described in the study deserved some punishment.91 This as-
sumption itself is noteworthy. Researchers from multiple disci-
plines over the course of decades have routinely assumed that 
no significant fraction of subjects would believe that the of-
fenses in question deserved no punishment. In short, even the 
experts in these fields discount the possibility that subjects 
would not want to punish. If all of these researchers are wrong, 
there likely would be evidence in the studies of subjects refus-
ing to assign punishment, by responding with only the mini-
mum possible amount of punishment in each case or by re-
sponding randomly. Yet these types of results did not occur, 
vindicating the researchers’ views. 
 
 85. Id. at 114 tbl.1. Note that the penultimate column is mislabeled “edu-
cation” and should read “execution”; therefore selections in this column should 
not be interpreted as a preference for “no punishment.” See id. at 115. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 25, app. A at 137 (instructing respon-
dents: “If YOU think something should not be a crime, give it a zero”). 
 89. See id. at 46–47 tbl.1. 
 90. See id. app. C at 158–61 tbl.C-1; see also Gibbons, supra note 19, at 
395. For each of twenty offenses, there were roughly three hundred respon-
dents. Id. Only four of the twenty offenses yielded more than 10% “no penalty” 
responses. See id. tbl.1. These were homosexuality, statutory rape (consensual 
sex between a twenty-year-old and a sixteen-year-old), draft evasion, and 
marijuana use. Id. at 394, 395 tbl.1. 
 91. WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 25, at 47 tbl.1. 
ROBINSON_KURZBAN_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:58:24 AM 
1850 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1829 
 
Taken together, these facts suggest that every study con-
ducted, including the ones reported here, supports the view 
that people share the intuition that serious wrongdoing should 
be punished. 
2. Behavioral Economics Studies 
In questionnaire studies, people are asked how much pun-
ishment is “right” or “justified” or “deserved.” They are not, 
however, required to incur any cost to inflict punishment. In 
some experiments, however, people must actually bear a cost to 
punish.92 These experiments typically investigate breaches of 
perceived norms, such as fairness, rather than criminal of-
fenses.93 That is, the wrongdoing being punished here typically 
is dramatically less serious than the kind of wrongdoing in-
volved in criminal violations.94 Thus, to the extent that persons 
are demonstrated as willing to bear the cost of punishment for 
violation of a civil norm, it seems reasonable to assume that 
they would similarly be willing to bear the cost of punish-
ment—or pay much more to punish—in cases of criminal 
wrongdoing. 
One game used in such studies tests the willingness to 
bear the costs to punish perceived unfairness is the so-called 
Ultimatum Game.95 In the typical version, experimental sub-
jects are brought into the laboratory and randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental “roles,” either that of the Proposer or 
the Responder.96 The Proposer is provisionally allocated a sum 
of money, called an “Endowment,” often ten dollars.97 The Pro-
poser suggests a split of the Endowment with the Responder, 
for example, six dollars for the Proposer, four dollars for the 
Responder.98 The Responder is then given the option of accept-
ing the offer, in which case the money is split as designated by 
 
 92. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Eco-
nomics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S290–91 (1986) (documenting how study participants 
voluntarily incurred a penalty in order to punish others for unfair behavior). 
 93. See id. at S288–92 (describing an experiment where the violation of 
the fairness norm was the inequitable distribution of twenty dollars between 
two participants). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN 
STRATEGIC INTERACTION 8–12, 43–113 (2003). 
 96. Id. at 8. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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the Proposer, or rejecting the proposal, in which case the ten 
dollars is not given to the subjects.99 
Proposers generally offer between 40% and 50% of the En-
dowment to Responders,100 but our interest is in situations in 
which Proposers offer a very unequal split. Under these condi-
tions, Responders often reject the proposals, costing them the 
amount offered by the Proposer, and thus depriving the Pro-
poser of her portion of the money.101 Such rejections are inter-
preted by researchers as cases in which Responders are punish-
ing Proposers for making unfair offers.102 This punishment 
happens under carefully controlled conditions, when the sub-
jects do not physically interact with one another, do not know 
one another’s identities, and when even the experimenter does 
not know the Responder’s decision.103 In short, people punish 
perceived unfairness at a cost to themselves, even when there 
are no instrumental consequences or experimenter expectations 
that might be at work.104 Even more striking, there is evidence 
that people will pay to punish another person even when they 
are not directly involved in the transaction if they perceive that 
the person has behaved intentionally unfairly.105 
 
 99. Id. It is important to note that these experimental games are almost 
always played for real money. 
 100. This result varies considerably depending on the details of the ex-
perimental procedure. See id. at 50–52 tbl.2.2. 
 101. Id. at 53–55 tbl.2.3. 
 102. Id. at 10. 
 103. See Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick, Anonymity Versus Punishment in 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95, 111 (1995) (showing 
that punishment occurs even when experimenters do not know subjects’ deci-
sions).  
 104. A wealth of data from behavioral economics, using methods from other 
games as well, is consistent with this conclusion. CAMERER, supra note 95, at 
43–117, is an excellent source for relevant work. For recent cross-cultural 
work using the Ultimatum Game, see Joseph Henrich et al., “Economic Man” 
in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale So-
cieties, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 799–801 (2005). 
 105. Kahneman et al., supra note 92, at S288–92. One set of subjects 
played a Dictator Game, which is similar to the Ultimatum Game except that 
the Responder must accept any offer. Id. at S290. After the Dictator Game was 
played, a separate set of subjects was given the opportunity to pay one dollar 
to deprive five dollars from someone who had taken a very unequal split 
(eighteen dollars / two dollars) in an earlier Dictator Game. Id. at S290–91. A 
“clear majority (74%)” of subjects chose to do so. Id. Although subsequent work 
has suggested that this experiment might have overestimated “third party 
punishment,” it is nonetheless clear that in the correct circumstances, people 
will pay to punish those who are perceived to have violated a fairness norm. 
See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social 
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3. Cross-Cultural Studies 
If notions of wrongdoing and punishment were absent from 
a culture, study respondents presumably would have difficulty 
understanding the task put to them or would be expected to 
randomly answer questions about these topics. We know of no 
researcher who has attempted to gather data on judgments 
about wrongdoing or punishment who has had difficulty in con-
veying the relevant questions and in obtaining coherent re-
sponses.106 
In fact, cross-cultural data suggest that questionnaire 
studies yield similar results in all of the cultures that have 
been studied. While we do not deny that there are important 
cultural differences, the intuition that those who commit 
wrongs should be punished seems to be universal. We do not 
know of any documented case of any culture in which the intui-
tion to punish serious wrongdoing did not exist. 
Experts commenting on this element of human culture 
show broad agreement. Cultural psychologist Paul Rozin and 
his colleagues conclude that “[m]oral judgment and the con-
demnation of others, including fictional others and others who 
have not harmed the self, is a universal and essential feature of 
human social life.”107 Similar sentiments have been expressed 
by developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan, who includes 
this intuition as one of “a limited number of universal moral 
categories that transcend time and locality.”108 Philosopher Ray 
Jackendoff concludes: “Thus in our culture, the legal system 
punishes not only physical aggression like assault, but also eco-
nomic aggression like stealing. Similar institutions are found in 
some form in every culture, even in the absence of written legal 
codes.”109 Anthropologist Donald Brown, in his exhaustive re-
 
Norms, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 68 (2004) (“Most third parties pun-
ished dictators who transferred less than half their endowment, and the ma-
jority of recipients expected them to do so.”). 
 106. See John R. Snarey, Cross-Cultural Universality of Social-Moral De-
velopment: A Critical Review of Kohlbergian Research, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 202, 
226 (1985) (reviewing cross-cultural data that reveal important universals in 
moral development). 
 107. Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between 
Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes 
(Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 
574 (1999). For a discussion of some psychologists (and others) who want to 
abolish punishment, see STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 181 (2002). 
 108. JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 118–19 (1984). 
 109. RAY JACKENDOFF, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, CONSCIOUSNESS: ESSAYS ON 
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view of the cross-cultural data, included intuitions surrounding 
justice and punishing transgressors as a “Human Universal.”110 
In short, experts from multiple disciplines have unambiguously 
asserted that, despite cultural differences, the intuition to pun-
ish is a key aspect of what it means to be a member of the hu-
man species. 
4. Are There Exceptions? 
We do not mean to imply that no human could conceive of a 
social structure in which people were not punished for their 
transgressions. We note that some religious writings might be 
taken to urge such a view, such as the biblical injunction to 
“turn the other cheek.” But we suggest that the significant 
point here is that this injunction is given precisely because it is 
understood to run counter to strong intuitions to punish serious 
wrongdoing.111 More importantly, it is hardly evidence contra-
dicting the existence of shared intuitions of justice that some 
people have called for the abolition of punishment, if the call is 
rarely if ever answered. 
Of course, one might argue that there are in fact historical 
figures who have believed that people should not be punished 
for their wrongdoing. For example, some might argue that Je-
sus Christ or Mahatma Gandhi were persons who would in fact 
“turn the other cheek,” disproving the claim of a universal hu-
man intuition to punish serious wrongdoing. There is reason to 
believe that even such icons of love and forgiveness in fact be-
lieved in punishment of wrongdoing. Biblical passages of 
 
MENTAL STRUCTURE (forthcoming June 2007) (manuscript at 4-25, available 
at http://people.brandeis.edu/~jackendo/ch4Soccog.pdf). 
 110. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 138 (1991). In describing the 
Universal People (UP)—his term for those features that all people from all cul-
tures share in common—he writes: 
The UP have law, at least in the sense of rules of membership in per-
petual social units and in the sense of rights and obligations attached 
to persons or other statuses. Among the UP’s laws are those that in 
certain situations proscribe violence and rape. Their laws also pro-
scribe murder—unjustified taking of human life (though they may 
justify taking lives in some contexts). They have sanctions for infrac-
tions, and these sanctions include removal of offenders from the social 
unit—whether by expulsion, incarceration, ostracism, or execution. 
They punish (or otherwise censure or condemn) certain acts that 
threaten the group or are alleged to do so. 
Id. 
 111. One translation of the relevant passage is: “I say unto you, That ye 
resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him 
the other also.” Matthew 5:38–:39 (King James). 
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Christ’s teachings are full of references calling for punish-
ment.112 And one might observe that Mahatma Gandhi advo-
cated strikes and sit-ins meant to punish the British.113 But the 
important point here is not the conduct of these persons and 
others like them but rather the fact that they have become his-
toric figures precisely because they seemed to advocate a posi-
tion so difficult for ordinary persons and so counter to human 
nature. Their historic status only serves to illustrate and con-
firm the strength of the human intuition to punish serious 
wrongdoing. 
B. INTUITIONS ON THE RELATIVE SERIOUSNESS OF 
WRONGDOING 
As is apparent from the quotations at the start of this Part, 
some writers might concede the existence of a shared intuition 
that serious wrongdoing should be punished but might dispute 
nonetheless that there is agreement on how punishment ought 
to be distributed across cases of wrongdoing. However, a sub-
stantial body of research indicates a broad consensus regarding 
the relative seriousness of different wrongdoings and the ap-
propriate relative amount of punishment.114 
It is not that everyone agrees on a specific sentence for 
each case. On the contrary, some people would give generally 
harsher punishment and others generally less harsh punish-
ment. But whether harsh or lenient punishers, people tend to 
 
 112. See, e.g., Matthew 25:46 (King James) (“These shall go away into ever-
lasting punishment.”); 2 Thessalonians 1:5–:10 (King James) (“Who shall be 
punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from 
the glory of his power. . . .”). Note that Paul does not seem to shy away from 
punishment in the present. He indicates that an individual in power “beareth 
not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute 
wrath upon him that doeth evil.” Romans 13:4 (King James). 
 113. Gandhi used civil disobedience as a tool to induce the British to leave. 
Civil disobedience was certainly a cost imposed on the British, particularly as 
they were fighting World War II. MAHATMA GANDHI, THE ESSENTIAL GANDHI: 
AN ANTHOLOGY OF HIS WRITINGS ON HIS LIFE, WORK, AND IDEAS 121–27 
(Louis Fischer ed., 2d ed. 2002). Punishment is inflicting a cost, albeit in this 
case on a group, rather than an individual. 
 114. An important distinction in discussion of consensus is between abso-
lute and relative judgments of seriousness or desert. Consensus in absolute 
judgments would mean that people agree on the seriousness of punishment—
fine, sentence length, none, etc.—for a given offense. Consensus in relative se-
riousness means that people agree on the ordering of offenses such that they 
agree which offenses are more serious than others but not necessarily on the 
specific amount of punishment deserved. See SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 
16, at 268. 
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agree on the relative degree of blameworthiness among a set of 
cases. That is, while they may disagree as to the point to which 
the punishment continuum should extend at its high end, they 
agree on the relative placement of cases along that continuum. 
Once a society determines the end point of the punishment con-
tinuum, shared intuitions of justice will set each case on a spe-
cific point on the continuum in its appropriate place relative to 
other cases. The specific amount of punishment due each case 
is fixed, then, not because there is some magical connection be-
tween that amount of punishment and that particular offense 
but rather because that is the amount of punishment needed to 
distinguish that case from cases of noticeably greater and 
lesser blameworthiness on the limited continuum of punish-
ment.115 
The existing studies reveal an extraordinary extent of 
agreement across a variety of issues and demographics. While a 
variety of testing techniques and subjects have been used, the 
conclusions are all essentially the same, confirming the exis-
tence of shared intuitions as to relative seriousness of different 
variations on wrongdoing. 
1. Previous Domestic Studies 
The most well known study is that of Sellin and Wolfgang, 
who in the 1960s surveyed 575 individuals across Pennsyl-
vania.116 Subjects were asked about the seriousness of fifty-one 
offenses, such as: “An offender forces a female to submit to sex-
ual intercourse. No other physical injury is inflicted.”117 The re-
searchers used two test methods. One method asked subjects to 
 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. When the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission reverted to basing its guidelines on mathematical averaging of 
past sentencing practice, it ignored the importance of this difference between 
absolute and relative punishment amounts. See Breyer, supra note 12, at 17. 
If it had sought to rely upon what judges had done in the past, it ought to have 
adjusted the punishment a judge handed out in different cases to account for 
whether that judge was generally more or less severe than the average judge. 
Different judges tended to contribute different kinds of cases to the statistical 
pool, thus each judge would likely have the greatest influence on the guide-
lines for the kind of cases she contributed. 
 116. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text; see also SELLIN & 
WOLFGANG, supra note 16, at 338–39 (describing a brief history of the limited 
work measuring perceptions of crime seriousness up to this study). 
 117. SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 16, at 381, 391. Twenty-one base of-
fenses were given to each rater in random order, plus a random assortment of 
thirty other crimes drawn from the remaining 120 offenses. Id. at 277. 
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place offenses on a scale ranging from one to eleven.118 Another 
method, referred to as a “magnitude estimation task,” asked 
subjects to assign the offense a number to indicate its serious-
ness relative to bicycle theft, which was assigned a value of 
ten.119 The results show broad agreement.120 The researchers 
conclude that “[t]he most strongly supported conclusion . . . is 
that all the raters . . . tended to assign the magnitude estima-
tions [so] that the seriousness of the crimes is evaluated in a 
similar way, without significant differences, by all the groups” 
and, further, that a “pervasive social agreement about what is 
serious and what is not appears to emerge . . . .”121 This study 
has been replicated, with results that support its original con-
clusions.122 
Since Sellin and Wolfgang, there have been many other 
studies using a variety of methods, all reaching similar conclu-
sions. Here is a sampling of five that are representative.123 
Jacoby and Cullen surveyed a national sample of 1920 adults 
who were read eight crime vignettes during thirty-minute tele-
phone interviews.124 The type of crime in each vignette was 
 
 118. Id. at 254. 
 119. Id. 
 120. For scale category means broken out by groups, see id. at 387–88. 
 121. Id. at 268. 
 122. For example, Roth replicated the Sellin and Wolfgang study in 1978, 
surveying 909 prosecutors across the United States. See Roth, supra note 34, 
at 233–34. Subjects were given a list of thirty-six brief offense descriptions, 
just as in the Sellin and Wolfgang survey. Thirteen offenses were the same for 
every survey; the rest were randomly selected from the remaining 250 of-
fenses. A ten-dollar larceny was the first crime in every booklet; the rest of the 
crimes were randomized. All items were drawn from the Sellin-Wolfgang in-
dex. Those surveyed were asked to estimate the relative seriousness of crimes. 
Id. at 233–35. Roth concluded, “These results are consistent with previous evi-
dence that the crime seriousness scale is invariant with respect to a wide vari-
ety of geographical and personal characteristics.” Id. at 242. 
 123. In a survey by Boydell and Grindstaff, 451 household heads in Lon-
don, Ontario, were given a list of eight crimes against a person—murder, rape, 
robbery, etc.—and asked the penalty they would impose for a typical offense, 
as well as the minimum and maximum penalty that ever should be imposed 
for the offense. Boydell & Grindstaff, supra note 84, at 113–14. The research-
ers analyzed the penalties imposed for each of the eight offenses according to 
the sex, age, income, and religious differences among the subjects and found 
few statistically significant differences. Id. at 116. They reported, “Of the 
forty-eight relationships investigated, only three (all relating to religion and 
religious attendance) produced statistically significant differences, and no 
general trends were discernible.” Id. They concluded, broadly, that demo-
graphics do not have important effects on people’s views on punishment for 
crimes against the person. Id. 
 124. See Jacoby & Cullen, supra note 73, at 263–65. One scenario included 
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taken from a list of twenty-four offenses.125 “Respondents 
agreed, on average, on the ordering of the twenty-four crimes in 
seriousness and deserved sentence length.”126 The researchers 
reported that the “amounts of variation in sentencing ac-
counted for by the individual characteristics studied was quite 
small, less than 10%.”127 
Blumstein and Cohen surveyed 603 residents of Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania; subjects were asked to assign the length 
of a prison sentence128 that “best fits the seriousness of the of-
fense” for twenty-three offenses that researchers presented in 
the form of brief crime scenarios.129 The researchers found no 
strong effects of demographics—including gender, race, reli-
gious affiliation, and level of education—on the ordering of sen-
tences. That is, different groups tended to agree on which 
crimes should be punished more than other crimes. They con-
cluded that there was “considerable agreement across various 
 
a bicycle theft, again assigned a seriousness of ten. Id. at 268–69. The seven 
non-bicycle vignettes were different for each subject and were constructed by a 
computer that randomly picked alterative facts relating to thirteen different 
aspects of the offense, including “the type of crime, amount of harm incurred 
by the victim, offender characteristics, and victim characteristics.” Id. at 268. 
Subjects also were asked to select the sentence they would give each offender. 
Id. 
All the commonly available punishments—jail or prison, probation, 
fine, restitution, and (for homicide offenses only) death—were then of-
fered. Respondents were asked which of these punishment types they 
would choose for the offender in that crime vignette. If they chose in-
carceration, they were asked whether the time should be served con-
tinuously or periodically and how long the sentence should be. If they 
chose a fine, they were asked the amount. Respondents could choose 
as many of these punishment types as they wished for each vignette. 
Id. at 269. 
 125. Id. at 265. 
 126. Id. at 285 (“[The subjects] did not agree on the appropriate value for 
seriousness or sentence length.”). 
 127. ROSSI & BERK, supra note 7, at 205. Translating quantitative results 
is always problematic, as people can reasonably disagree about what consti-
tutes “a lot” or “a little” disagreement. In this case, the characterization of this 
level of disagreement—only 10%—as “small” seems very reasonable. 
 128. Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 28, at 227–31. According to the survey 
instructions, “sentence” meant the amount of time the offender would actually 
serve. Id. at 229. 
 129. Id. at 228–29. A sample scenario: first-degree murder: “The offender is 
convicted of first degree murder after he intentionally killed a person who 
witnessed a crime he had committed.” The offenses represented a significant 
contribution to present prison populations in the United States (i.e., first-
degree murder, narcotics sales). Id. at 228. 
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demographic groups on the relative severity of the sentences to 
be imposed for different offenses.”130 
Peter H. Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine E. Bose, and Rich-
ard E. Berk interviewed 125 whites and seventy-five blacks in 
Baltimore, Maryland with a roughly equal number of males 
and females, asking people to categorize eighty offenses each 
into nine categories according to how serious the offense was 
perceived to be.131 The correlations between ratings of blacks 
and whites, males and females, and more and less educated 
groups were 0.89, 0.94, and 0.89 respectively, indicating a sub-
stantial amount of agreement.132 The researchers concluded 
that “the amount of consensus among subgroup averages is im-
pressive”133 and that “the norms defining how serious various 
criminal acts are considered to be, are quite widely distributed 
among blacks and whites, males and females, high and low so-
cioeconomic levels, and among levels of educational attain-
ment.”134 
 
 130. Id. at 223 (noting, however, that there was “disagreement over the ab-
solute magnitude of these sentences”). 
These researchers were interested in the relationship between their re-
spondents’ assignments of sentences and sentences given to real offenders who 
had committed crimes that fit the descriptions, as well as the relationship be-
tween assignments of sentences and the amount of time served by individuals 
who had committed such crimes. Id. at 258–61. They concluded that 
“[c]onsiderable discrepancies exist between recommended sentence lengths 
and actual time served, but there is substantial agreement between recom-
mended sentences and actual sentences.” Id. at 258. 
 131. Rossi et al., supra note 19, at 226. Sample offenses ranged from the 
“planned killing of a policeman” to “being drunk in public places.” Id. at 228–
29 tbl.1. 
 132. Id. at 230 tbl.2. Again, characterizing quantitative data as large or 
small is open to reasonable disagreement. These numbers would generally be 
considered to be large by conventional standards in statistics. See JACOB 
COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 80 (2d 
ed. 1988) (“[T]he practical upper limit of predictive effectiveness . . . [is] . . . a 
validity coefficient of the order of .50.” (citing E.E. GHISELLI, PERSONAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 17, 61–63 (1964))). Correlation values range between -1 and +1. A 
value of -1 means a perfect inverse relationship (as one variable goes up, the 
other goes down), a value of zero means no relationship (the two variables are 
unrelated to one another), and a value of +1 means a perfect positive relation-
ship (as one variable increases, the other variable increases). The values re-
ported here, which are close to one, indicate that the ratings of the two groups 
were very similar to one another. 
 133. Rossi et al., supra note 19, at 231. 
 134. Id. at 237. The analysis also showed that “the more highly educated 
and the younger respondents were, the more likely were their individual rat-
ings of criminal acts to agree with the average computed for the entire sample 
. . . suggesting that exposure to the normative structure and language han-
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Lee Hamilton and Steve Rytina conducted face-to-face in-
terviews with 391 subjects in the Boston area in which they 
asked subjects to rank each of seventeen offenses using a 
“magnitude estimation task” similar to the one described 
above.135 A comparison of the individuals’ judgments of seri-
ousness and desired punishments with the sample’s average 
judgments gave high correlations—0.71 and 0.73, respec-
tively—suggesting “a high level of consensus.”136 An analysis of 
the demographic differences among the subjects—age, race, in-
come, and sex—showed no strong effects.137 
Charles W. Thomas, Robin Cage, and Samuel C. Foster 
surveyed 3334 households, asking subjects what they felt would 
be a “fair sentence” for each of seventeen offenses.138 They re-
ported finding “evidence of a remarkable level of consensus, 
even after separating the sample on the basis of their sex, race, 
age, income, occupational prestige, and educational attain-
ment.”139 They concluded that the findings, “regardless of the 
type or category of offense examined, are not supportive of any 
prediction that suggests variations between different categories 
of the population in either perceptions of relative seriousness of 
these offenses, or the level of sanctions that are viewed as ap-
propriate.”140 
To conclude, we have reviewed studies that asked subjects 
about crime seriousness, preferred sentences, or both.141 These 
 
dling ability lead to better knowledge of the normative structure.” Id. 
 135. Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 33, at 1124–26. Offenses on the list 
included, for example, “Taking $50” and “Forcible rape.” Id. at 1125 tbl.1. Sub-
jects were also given a questionnaire that outlined “concrete crimes.” Id. For 
example, one such crime was relayed as follows: “One week he [she] was short 
on money, he [she] took an envelope . . . [that] contained $50 in cash.” Id. at 
1125 n.9. Also included were the appropriate legal charges, for example, 
“charged with $50 larceny.” Id. Participants were asked to assess the relative 
seriousness of these acts and to assign punishments. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1132. 
 137. Hamilton and Rytina report only a “weak” effect of race and income. 
Id. The results of the analysis for education suggest these differences are not 
due to differences in education by race or income. Id. at 1134. 
 138. Charles W. Thomas et al., Public Opinion on Criminal Law and Legal 
Sanctions: An Examination of Two Conceptual Models, 67 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 110, 112 (1976). Offenses were described by labels such as 
“murder” or “rape.” Id. at 113 tbl.1. 
 139. Id. at 116. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 28, at 226 (analyzing Arnold 
M. Rose & Arthur E. Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 61 AM. J. SOC. 
247 (1955)); see also Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 33, at 1130; Michael 
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two kinds of inquiries are related but not identical. The second 
includes a broader range of factors—beyond the seriousness of 
the criminal act itself—such as the consequences of the act, fea-
tures of the perpetrator, the perpetrator’s prior history, and 
characteristics of the victim.142 Nonetheless, testing of both of-
fense seriousness and deserved punishment consistently shows 
substantial consensus. 
What is particularly striking about these studies is that, by 
virtue of their design, one could expect a fair amount of dis-
agreement. When two people are given a skeletal description of 
an offense, as most of these studies provide, both of the persons 
are likely to visualize a “story” of the offense, yet they may well 
“fill in” different details to complete the picture. Demographic 
differences could prompt subjects to fill in different details, re-
flecting the different life experiences from which the details are 
drawn. If subjects visualize slightly different stories, one would 
expect them to give slightly different assessments of relative 
seriousness, even if they in fact agreed in their intuitive judg-
ments. This potential for exaggerating the extent of disagree-
ment becomes greater as the crime descriptions become more 
skeletal, and is at its worst when researchers use crime labels 
rather than factual descriptions, as in some of the studies re-
ported above, because different people are quite likely to visual-
ize different stories when given just the bare offense label. De-
spite this serious potential to underestimate the extent of 
agreement, the studies consistently show a significant level of 
agreement on intuitions of justice, even across demographics. 
Rossi and Berk, in their review of the literature through 
1997, suggest that the studies converge on the view that people 
share intuitions about the relative seriousness of wrongdo-
ing.143 “[A] [f ]airly strong consensus exists on the seriousness 
 
O’Connell & Anthony Whelan, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Public Perceptions of 
Crime Seriousness, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 299, 310 tbl.2 (1996); Rossi et al., 
supra note 79, at 61. 
 142. Rossi et al., supra note 79, at 63–68 (describing the selection of per-
sonal vignettes that include a variety of characteristics unique to the crime, 
perpetrator, and victim). 
 143. See, e.g., PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, A NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY: PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FED-
ERAL CRIMES 193 (1995) (discussing sentencing, but in absolute, and not rela-
tive terms); Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, A Conceptual Framework for 
Measuring Norms, in THE SOCIAL FABRIC: DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES 77, 103 
(James F. Short, Jr. ed., 1986) (presenting models on consensus and “at-
tempt[ing] to lay the foundations for exploring normative structures based on 
both technical and conceptual tools”); Peter H. Rossi & Patrick Henry, Seri-
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ordering of crimes, with those involving actual or threatened 
physical harm to victims generally considered to be the most 
serious . . . .”144 In fact, their summary of previous studies sug-
gest that “there is very little, if any evidence that there exist 
subgroups within the American population with radically dif-
ferent views about sentencing norms,” and that “[t]here is no 
evidence for a normative order that is an alternative to what 
the overwhelming majority of the American population be-
lieve.”145 
 
ousness: A Measure for All Purposes?, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
EVALUATION 489, 489–91 (Malcolm W. Klein & Katherine S. Teilmann eds., 
1980); Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, Varieties of Normative Consensus, 50 
AM. SOC. REV. 333, 340 (1985) (“Model V more or less describes the majority 
of, if not most, normative domains in our society: People by and large agree on 
what the norms are but differ in their degrees of attachment to the normative 
structure so defined.”); see also id. at 339 (“Under this condition, individual 
members of the society need not agree on the specific judgments to be ren-
dered on each moral application, but each individual can be different from the 
others by [a specific constant].”). 
 144. ROSSI & BERK, supra note 7, at 12; see also SELLIN & WOLFGANG, su-
pra note 16, at 324 (comparing studies of crime seriousness). 
 145. ROSSI & BERK, supra note 7, at 209. Durham expresses skepticism 
about consensus research. One concern focuses on “the appropriate amount 
and kind of information to include” when eliciting judgments about specific 
criminal acts. Durham, supra note 80, at 6. This concern is largely irrelevant 
to our thesis because we are uncommitted with respect to these details, and 
we accept that information is a potentially important factor in these judg-
ments. Durham also worries about the fact that some stimuli are unfamiliar to 
subjects. Id. (noting that respondents may express an unfounded opinion 
about an entirely fictitious event). This objection works in our favor; to the ex-
tent that subjects are unfamiliar, “noise” is added to the data, and so consen-
sus has been, if anything, underestimated. See id. at 1.  
  In George Bishop and his colleague’s test with fictitious stimuli, re-
spondents were divided on an agree/disagree task. George F. Bishop et al., 
Pseudo-Opinions on Public Affairs, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 198, 199–200 (1980). 
Lack of familiarity tends to minimize consensus, just as one would expect. See 
id. at 201 tbl.1. The objections that interviews put constraints on time or that 
respondents might not understand vignettes similarly bolster, rather than un-
dermine our position; such constraints should also add “noise” to the data, un-
dermining consensus. See Terance D. Miethe, Public Consensus on Crime Se-
riousness: Normative Structure or Methodological Artifact?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 
515, 523–24 (1982) (“However, it has been argued here that subgroup consen-
sus may not exist at all and if it does, it may be located within specific types of 
criminal acts due to the possibility of a legal bias in the instructions given to 
raters. The accurate determination of the extent of public consensus on the 
seriousness of criminal acts has a number of practical, as well as theoretical, 
implications. As such, being able to dismiss these alternative explanations is 
of primary importance for evaluating the utility of seriousness studies. Fur-
thermore, only by adopting the research strategies discussed in this article is 
it possible to evaluate whether or not consensus truly exists.”). 
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2. Cross-Cultural Studies 
The cross-cultural evidence appears to support the view 
that people everywhere share intuitions of justice about the 
relative blameworthiness of serious wrongdoing. The four stud-
ies that follow are representative.146 
Michael O’Connell and Anthony Whelan surveyed 623 in-
dividuals in the greater Dublin, Ireland area, asking subjects to 
rate ten offense descriptions on a 1 to 11 scale of seriousness.147 
Clear ordering of offenses emerged, suggesting textured intui-
tions regarding seriousness and deserved punishment.148 A 
comparison of the Irish data with a British sample from a dec-
ade earlier found that, “Irish perceptions of crime . . . have 
much in common with those in other jurisdictions,”149 especially 
with regard to more serious crimes.150 
Following in the tradition of Sellin and Wolfgang, Marlene 
Hsu administered a survey to six hundred Chinese persons in 
Taiwan, including students, police officers, and judges.151 Sub-
 
 146. Joseph E. Scott and Fahad Al-Thakeb compared answers regarding 
what individuals deemed the “proper punishment” for twenty-four specific 
crimes among subjects in Denmark, Finland, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, and the United States. Joseph E. Scott & Fahad Al-Thakeb, The 
Public’s Perceptions of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of Scandinavia, West-
ern Europe, the Middle East and the United States, in CONTEMPORARY COR-
RECTIONS: SOCIAL CONTROL AND CONFLICTS 78, 79 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 1977). 
Eleven punishments—from no penalty to execution—were available. Id. at 80. 
The researchers found that “[a] great deal of similarity exists among countries 
as to the rank ordered seriousness” for the subset of offenses involving physi-
cal harm and theft. Id. at 83. Only slight differences existed. In general, vio-
lent offenses, such as murder, rape, and assault, were regarded as more seri-
ous than property crimes. Id. However, in Kuwait, burglary was rated more 
serious than assault. Id. at 85. Also in Kuwait, drug offenses such as selling 
heroin or marijuana were also regarded as more serious than offenses such as 
rape and robbery. Id. at 86. Statistical tests were not provided, so it is not pos-
sible to know which differences are significant. Id. The authors also found “an 
apparent overall similarity among countries in the perceived seriousness of 
white-collar offenses.” Id. They conclude with respect to their international 
comparisons that, with the exception of Kuwait, “levels of moral indignation 
for all offenses are much more similar than they are different.” Id. at 87. 
 147. O’Connell & Whelan, supra note 141, at 302–04. One thousand names 
were randomly selected from the 1992 electoral register for the greater area of 
Dublin, and 623 persons responded. Id. at 302–03. An example of a tested sce-
nario includes: “The offender attacks a victim with a knife and the victim 
dies.” Id. at 304. 
 148. Id. at 310 tbl.2. 
 149. Id. at 316. 
 150. Id. at 310–11. 
 151. Marlene Hsu, Cultural and Sexual Differences on the Judgment of 
Criminal Offenses: A Replication Study of the Measurement of Delinquency, 64 
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jects were asked for seriousness judgments of fourteen of-
fenses—which were the fourteen index offenses of Sellin and 
Wolfgang translated into Chinese—on an eleven-point scale.152 
Hsu found broad agreement across the three Taiwanese sam-
ples (students, police, and judges); correlation coefficients were 
all above 0.90, and similar ordinal judgments in the relative 
ranking of the fourteen offenses between the Chinese and 
American samples, with a coefficient of 0.84—0.95 among male 
subjects.153 The Sellin and Wolfgang study has been replicated 
in many other studies in other countries, reaching similar con-
clusions about shared intuitions of justice.154 
 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348, 350 (1973). 
 152. Some of the offenses were changed slightly to better fit Chinese cul-
ture. Id. at 349. For example, the stealing of an automobile was changed to 
stealing a motorcycle because cars were much more rare in China, and as a 
result, subjects might consider auto theft a more serious offense. Id. 
 153. Id. at 351 tbl.2. As noted throughout this Article, characterizing coef-
ficients is subjective. However, these values are very reasonably characterized 
as “large,” particularly given that these are cross-cultural comparisons. Id. at 
350 tbl.1. 
 154. In another replication of Sellin and Wolfgang, André Normandeau 
surveyed 232 introductory sociology students at the University of Montreal—
177 males and 55 females. André Normandeau, The Measurement of Delin-
quency in Montreal, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 172, 173 
(1966). Subjects were asked to rate fifteen offense descriptions, such as: “An 
offender forces a female to submit to sexual intercourse. No other physical in-
jury is inflicted.” Id. at 173 n.7. Subjects rated such crimes on an eleven-point 
scale. Id. Normandeau used Sellin and Wolfgang’s fourteen index offenses, but 
added one item to the list. Id. When compared to Sellin and Wolfgang’s find-
ings, the results showed a substantial correlation—above 0.9—which led the 
researchers to conclude that, “there is a large amount of agreement about the 
numerical scoring of seriousness of offenses between [American and Canadian 
subjects].” Id. at 174. Note that agreement regarding ordering was more sub-
stantial than absolute judgments. 
In yet another replication of Sellin and Wolfgang, Angel Velez-Diaz and 
Edwin L. Megargee surveyed 175 individuals in San Juan, Puerto Rico—
eighty-three “offenders” and ninety-two “non-offenders.” See Angel Velez-Diaz 
& Edwin L. Megargee, An Investigation of Difference in Value Judgments Be-
tween Youthful Offenders and Non-Offenders in Puerto Rico, 61 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 549, 550 (1970). “Offenders” consisted of inmates 
of the Institute of Youthful Offenders. Id. The “non-offenders” were drawn 
from a vocational school close to the Institute of Youthful Offenders. Id. The 
non-offenders were judged to be quite similar to the offenders in most charac-
teristics except, of course, their lack of criminal record. Id. Subjects were 
asked to rate on an eleven-point scale a list of offense descriptions which were 
the same as those used by Sellin and Wolfgang. Id. at 551. The offenses in-
cluded twenty-one standard offenses and twenty additional offenses, all being 
drawn from Sellin and Wolfgang’s original 141 offenses. Id. at 550. They found 
reasonably high agreement with the Sellin and Wolfgang study when com-
pared to “lower class Puerto Rican offenders and non-offenders,” reporting cor-
ROBINSON_KURZBAN_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:58:24 AM 
1864 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1829 
 
Graeme Newman sampled 2360 individuals from a number 
of different cultures—India (512), Indonesia (500), Iran (479), 
Italy (200), United States (169), and Yugoslavia (500)—chosen 
for their supposed important cultural differences.155 Subjects 
were asked to rate serious offenses, described very briefly and 
with a minimum of surrounding circumstances, on a twelve-
point scale.156 Newman reports that, “If one were to order the 
acts according to the proportions of each country sample crimi-
nalizing them, one would find a general consensus across all 
countries as to the extent that all acts should be tolerated.”157 
Newman also reports that, “At the general level of analysis, it 
is apparent that there was considerable agreement as to the 
amount of official punishment appropriate to each act”158 and 
that looking at relative rankings indicates “general agreement 
in ranks across all countries.”159 
Cross-cultural agreement exists on issues beyond just 
ranking of harm seriousness. David M. Bersoff and Joan G. 
Miller presented 180 adults and children aged eight to ten 
years old in the United States and India with vignettes in 
which an offender harmed another person or committed a viola-
 
relations around 0.7 for pairs of samples. Id. at 553. Four correlations were 
drawn: between Puerto Rican offenders and Pennsylvania students, between 
Puerto Rican offenders and Pennsylvania police, between Pennsylvania non-
offenders and students, and between Pennsylvania non-offenders and police. 
Id. at 552 tbl.3. They also performed a test using “Kendall’s coefficient of con-
cordance, W,” which measures the extent to which there is agreement in how 
sets of items are ordered. Id. at 553. If there was perfect agreement in how all 
the groups surveyed assigned offenses to the eleven-point scale, a value of 1.0 
would be obtained, and a value of 0.0 would indicate no agreement whatso-
ever. See infra text accompanying note 180. A value of 0.8 was obtained, indi-
cating very substantial agreement on relative ordering. Velez-Diaz & Magar-
gee, supra, at 553. There was no significant difference in ratings between 
offenders and non-offenders. Id. 
 155. GRAEME NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN 
SIX CULTURES 70, 110–11 tbl.3 (1976). 
 156. Id. at 60. The range included zero, unlike Sellin and Wolfgang’s classic 
work. Id. 
 157. Id. at 115. 
 158. Id. at 140. 
 159. Id. at 141, 142–43 tbl.12; see also id. at 135–48 (discussing differences 
in views regarding how particular acts should be controlled or punished). Peo-
ple from different cultures might share the intuition that an act is wrong, and 
might even agree on an act’s relative seriousness, but might differ in how pun-
ishment should be imposed—whether by the state, family, or some other 
source. Id. This discussion highlights the importance of assessing intuitions 
regarding seriousness as distinct from preferred punishments meted out by 
the state. While the former might be correlated strongly with the latter in 
some contexts, the correlation will be weaker in others. 
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tion of property rights, such as theft, and where the circum-
stances of the offense varied, being either accidental or inten-
tional.160 The accidental offenses were similarly exculpated 
across cultures and age ranges: 91% and 100% of the time 
across samples.161 This finding indicates broad cross-cultural 
support for intent as a mediating factor.162 Other studies reach 
similar conclusions.163 
These studies represent only a fraction of the evidence re-
garding cross-cultural similarities. Jonathan Haidt and his col-
leagues, in their discussion of the variability in what cultures 
consider immoral, suggested: “Harm, broadly construed to in-
clude psychological harm, injustice, and violation of rights, may 
be important in the morality of all cultures.”164 Such conclu-
sions obviously resonate closely with our thesis.165 
 
 160. David M. Bersoff & Joan G. Miller, Culture, Context, and the Devel-
opment of Moral Accountability Judgments, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
664, 666–67 (1993). 
 161. Id. at 671. Emotional duress or immaturity of the agent showed some 
developmental and substantial cross-cultural variability. Id. 
 162. See Cecilia Wainryb et al., Tolerance and Intolerance: Children’s and 
Adolescents’ Judgments of Dissenting Beliefs, Speech, Persons, and Conduct, 
69 CHILD DEV. 1541, 1553 (1998) (reporting that “children and adolescents 
were relatively more accepting of people engaged in potentially harmful or un-
fair practices who held dissenting informational beliefs than of those who held 
dissenting moral beliefs” and that subjects “reasoned that persons holding dis-
senting informational beliefs, although misinformed, were well-intentioned”). 
 163. Similarly, Joseph Sanders and V. Lee Hamilton compared preference 
for punishment among subjects in Japan, Russia, and the United States for a 
crime—robbery with accidental death—as opposed to a situation in which a 
mother strikes her young child. Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Legal Cul-
tures and Punishment Repertoires in Japan, Russia, and the United States, 26 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 122–29 (1992). In the former case, subjects in all three 
cultures expressed universal agreement that the perpetrator should be pun-
ished—99%, 99%, and 96%, respectively; for the latter case, there was much 
less agreement—56%, 21%, and 26%, respectively. Id. at 127. The directional 
effect of mediating factors—mental state, consequences of the criminal’s ac-
tions, and the perpetrator’s history—were all the same, though not always sta-
tistically significant. Id. at 131. 
 164. Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to 
Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 613 (1993). 
 165. There are indeed acts that are considered “wrong” which vary greatly 
from culture to culture in some domains. The fact that people in one culture 
think that failing to keep a promise to visit one’s mother’s grave weekly is 
something worthy of punishment might seem odd to Westerners, and might 
seem to indicate vast uncharted depths of moral variability. However, consid-
ering acts outside of the deeper conceptual structure risks missing the point. 
Central to our discussion is that even though different acts are “moralized” 
from one culture to the next, what makes an act immoral is the concurrent be-
lief that those who perform the act should be punished, and this intuition is 
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III.  TESTING THE LIMITS OF AGREEMENT  
As reviewed in the previous Part, earlier studies estab-
lished the existence of shared intuitions of justice. We sought to 
build upon that work by investigating its limits. Just how nu-
anced could these intuitions be? Just how far could one push 
laypersons in making distinctions among cases with how wide a 
range of factors? 
Our first task was to design a method that minimized test-
ing factors that obscure the extent of agreement. For example, 
we speculated that both the use of factual descriptions rather 
than abstract offense labels and the use of full rather than 
skeletal fact patterns would reduce the problem of inadver-
tently creating cases that different subjects would perceive dif-
ferently. We also used a card sorting procedure with scenario 
headings that might allow an increase in the number and com-
plexity of the distinctions that we asked subjects to make.166 
We sought to find the outer limits to the nuance and vari-
ety of scenarios on which subjects would express consensus. 
Could we get subjects to distinguish two dozen scenarios on a 
single continuum of punishment—making quite subtle differ-
ences between each adjacent pair—yet still get a high level of 
agreement in their rank ordering? Could we get subjects to 
make fine distinctions, and agree in their judgments, when 
they were judging not just cases that differed in tangible 
harms, like physical injury, but also differed in intangible 
harms, such as the extent of intrusion of privacy, or differed in 
mitigating and excusing conditions, or differed in the vulner-
ability of the victim?167  
We used the same test instrument in two different sets of 
studies. In the first set, reported here as Studies 1 and 3, the 
test instrument was administered in person to subjects who 
rank ordered twenty-four cards on a large table.168 In the sec-
ond set of studies, identified here as Studies 2 and 4, subjects 
performed the task over the Internet, using a software program 
in which they “dragged” each scenario to its appropriate place 
among the other scenarios. The use of the Internet introduced 
 
widely shared within and between groups. Beneath cultural variability lies the 
universal intuition that acts that are wrong should be punished. Id. The spe-
cific acts to which this pertains vary dramatically. Id. 
 166. The study’s directions to subjects are reproduced in infra Appendix A. 
 167. See the description of the differences among scenarios summarized in 
infra Appendix B. 
 168. See infra Appendix A. 
ROBINSON_KURZBAN_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:58:24 AM 
2007] INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 1867 
 
certain complications in assuring that subjects understood and 
were motivated to undertake the relatively demanding tasks, 
but it also allowed for the collection of data from a greater 
number of subjects with a wider range of demographic charac-
teristics. 
To signal our results, we found that, despite the dramati-
cally greater difficulty of this task over those of previous stud-
ies, the levels of agreement in rank ordering were astonishingly 
high. In other words, we failed to find the limits of shared in-
tuitions of justice for core wrongdoing. 
A. EXTENT OF AGREEMENT: STUDY 1 
1. Method 
Participants were given twenty-four short scenarios, each 
on a separate card describing an event during which “John” en-
gages in conduct that may be a criminal offense.169 Participants 
were asked to rank-order the cards on a table to reflect amount 
of punishment, if any, that John deserves.170 The scenarios in-
cluded such offenses as theft by taking, theft by fraud, property 
destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, rape, neg-
ligent homicide, manslaughter, murder, and torture, in a vari-
ety of situations, including self-defense, provocation, duress, 
mistake, and mental illness.171 The kinds of offenses in the sce-
narios represent 94.9% of the offenses committed in the United 
States.172 When the participant completed the rank ordering, 
he or she was asked to reconsider each pair of scenarios to con-
firm that each pair was ordered as wished.173 This task typi-
cally took participants between thirty and forty minutes. Each 
 
 169. The text of the twenty-four scenarios is reproduced in infra Appendix 
A. 
 170. For the directions to participants and administrators, see the end of 
infra Appendix A. 
 171. See infra Appendix A. 
 172. The offenses in the scenarios, which are the most common offenses 
committed in the United States, include: sexual assault, 0.8% of all offenses; 
robbery, 2.5%; assault, 19.0%; household burglary, 14.0%; and theft 58.6%. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2003 STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.1 (2005). 
 173. The rank ordering task of so many scenarios is quite challenging for 
many people because it requires a concentration and perseverance beyond that 
which some people typically are called upon to do in their daily lives. The sec-
ond run-through was useful for some participants in giving them a chance to 
review their work. 
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participant also filled out a form that collected demographic in-
formation.174 
2. Results 
Table 1 orders the scenarios in the modal order produced 
by the subject pool as a group. This is also the predicted rank 
order.175 The first four scenarios were most commonly rated as 
deserving no liability or punishment. Scenario 5 was a border-
line case. About a quarter of the subjects thought there should 
not be punishment, while the remainder thought there should 
be, but most subjects agreed that it should be ranked as more 
aggravated than the four no punishment scenarios and less ag-
gravated than the other nineteen scenarios. Mean ranks in or-
dinal data obviously have limited usefulness but are provided 
here simply to give a heuristic sense of the distribution for each 
scenario.176 
 
 174. For a summary of the demographics of the sample, see infra note 183. 
 175. The reasons underlying the predictions are set out in infra Appendix 
B. 
 176. For example, the mean value of 23.9 for Scenario 24 affords the infer-
ence that nearly every subject ranked this scenario last. 
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Table 1: Summary Data from Study 1 
Scenario Mode Rank % Assigning Mean Rank 
  “No Liability” 
S1 (defending) no punish 91 ∗ 
S2  (coercion) no punish 92 ∗ 
S3  (umbrella) no punish 92 ∗ 
S4  (hallucination) no punish 92 ∗ 
S5  (pies) 5 27 3.9 
S6  (T-shirt) 6 8 6.3 
S7  (short change) 7 9 6.8 
S8  (radio) 8 5 7.6 
S9  (drill) 9 3 8.8 
S10  (microwave) 10 2 9.9 
S11  (TV) 11 2 10.4 
S12  (slap) 12 0 12.1 
S13  (head-butt) 13 2 13.0 
S14  (stitches) 14 0 14.1 
S15  (necklace) 15 0 14.8 
S16  (robbery) 16 0 15.6 
S17  (clubbing) 17 0 16.8 
S18  (pit bulls) 18 0 18.2 
S19  (infant) 19 3 18.6 
S20  (stabbing) 20 0 19.7 
S21  (ambush) 21 0 20.9 
S22  (abduction) 22 0 21.7 
S23  (burning) 23 0 23.0 
S24  (ransom) 24 0 23.9 
N = 24 
∗  The means for these four scenarios are 0.6, 0.3, 1.4, 0.3, respectively, 
where a response of “no punishment” is given a value of 0. 
 
The task asked of the subjects was quite complex. Ranking 
each scenario required a comparison to each of the other sce-
narios. We expected an unavoidable amount of “noise” in the 
data to reflect the fact that many subjects would have difficulty 
sustaining the required level of concentration for the length of 
time required for the task. Thus, it was quite surprising that 
the results nonetheless were rather clear and dramatic. 
For the first four scenarios, there was overwhelming con-
sensus that “no punishment” was appropriate. Ninety-two per-
cent of the time subjects agreed that no punishment was de-
served. The sixty-four subjects each judged these four 
scenarios—a total of 256 judgments—and in 235 instances con-
cluded that no punishment was deserved. 
Table 2 lists the remaining twenty scenarios in increasing 
order based on the subject group’s modal ranking. Each cell 
shows the frequencies with which subjects deviated from the 
group’s modal ranking of each pair of scenarios. In other words, 
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it counts the “deviations” from the group judgment. For exam-
ple, the intersection of S7 (short change scenario) and S9 (drill 
theft scenario) indicates that nine subjects ranked S9 as less 
serious than S7, deviating from the more common view that S9 
(drill theft) was more serious than the S7 (short change). 
 
Table 2: Deviations from Modal Ranks in Study 1 
   S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 
 S5  0 04 5 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 S6   0 23 12 5 2 2 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 S7    0 17 9 7 9 3 3 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 S8     0 12 5 5 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 S9      0 10 7 4 3 2 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 S10       0 13 6 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 S11        0 06 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 S12         0 09 6 7 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 
 S13          0 09 11 4 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 
 S14           0 19 9 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 
 S15            0 20 5 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 S16             0 06 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 
 S17              0 04 5 1 0 0 0 0 
 S18               0 19 5 2 1 0 0 
 S19                0 19 10 9 3 1 
 S20                 0 04 3 1 0 
 S21                  0 10 1 0 
 S22                   0 02 0 
 S23                    0 05 
 S24                     0 
N = 64 
NB: Shading indicates instances where adjacent scenarios were “flipped” by subjects in their rankings. 
 
Each of the sixty-four subjects could have deviated from 
the group modal ranking as to each of the 190 pairwise judg-
ments—the number of cells on the table177—for a total number 
of 12,160 possible deviations from modal pairwise ranking.178 
Note that if a subject ranks a scenario different from the modal 
ranking, that choice may produce many pairwise “deviations.” 
For example, a subject who agreed with the modal ranking in 
every respect, except that he ranked S11 much higher, as more 
 
 177. Where n is the number of scenarios, this is n(n-1)/2. 
 178. Of course, as a practical matter, this value overstates the total num-
ber of possible deviations because we rank the scenarios in order based on the 
observed modal rankings. Consider Scenario 5. Because the most frequent 
ranking of this scenario was the least serious of the twenty punishment sce-
narios, we know that at least those subjects who ranked Scenario 5 as the 
least serious could not, in principle, produce a deviation between Scenario 5 
and the remaining scenarios, effectively limiting the total number of possible 
deviations. 
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serious than S19, would, by his ranking of that one scenario, 
produce eight deviations. That is, he would have deviated from 
the judgments of the other subjects in eight different pairwise 
judgments, S11 versus S12, S11 versus S13, etc. 
The subjects had a total of 480 deviations, meaning that 
the subjects reversed the modal pairwise ranking only 4% of the 
time. This means that subjects agreed with the modal pairwise 
ranking 96% of the time, as compared to the approximately 
50% agreement rate that a random ranking of pairs would 
give.179 
The most common deviation, as one might guess, was for a 
subject to “flip” the ranking of two scenarios that were adjacent 
in the group’s modal ranking—for example, a subject ordering 
the scenarios as S6, S8, S7, S9, “flipping” scenarios S7 and S8. 
Of the total 480 deviations, 211 were such “adjacent flip” devia-
tions. If these simple “flips” of adjacent scenarios are excluded, 
the percentage of pairwise rankings that deviate from the mode 
is only 2%. 
More sophisticated statistical methods of analysis are 
available, most importantly Kendall’s coefficient of concordance 
(Kendall’s W), which measures agreement (concordance) among 
different sets of rank orderings of the same set.180 This coeffi-
cient measures the concordance shown in the entire ranking, 
not just in a set of pairwise comparisons. A coefficient of 1.0 in-
dicates perfect agreement, a 0.0 indicates no agreement.181 For 
the twenty-four scenarios in the study, the Kendall’s W is 0.95 
(with p < 0.001).182 This is an astounding level of agreement. 
The participants in the study were a diverse group in some 
ways but not others.183 The group was not an accurate propor-
 
 179. A random set of responses would have roughly 50% of agreement with 
the modal pairwise ranking. Thus, the relevant point of comparison here is the 
amount of agreement over 50%, not over 0%. 
 180. See JERROLD H. ZAR, BIOSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS 390 (3d ed. 1996). 
 181. See id. 
 182. N = 64; Chi-square = 1397.9; df = 23. The p value indicates how 
unlikely it is that this result would occur due to chance if people were respond-
ing at random. 
 183. Here is what the participants look like as a group: 
Gender: male 36%, female 64% 
Marital status: single 23%, married 58%, divorced 9%, widowed 8% 
Have children?: yes 70%, no 30% 
Race: white 91%, nonwhite 9% 
Education: some college 5%, two-year college degree 2%, four-year col-
lege degree 38%, masters degree 39%, doctorate/professional degree 
17% 
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tional representation of the society generally, but this fact was 
of little consequence given that the claim being investigated did 
not relate to representativeness. With so little disagreement 
among the group, combined with the subject pool size of sixty-
four, it would be difficult if not impossible to find variation in 
results according to demographic variables. 
3. Discussion 
 Preliminarily, note that the present study confirms the 
rather basic conclusion of Part II.A that people do indeed share 
an intuition that serious wrongdoing should be punished. Each 
subject in the study could have judged “no liability” for any or 
all of the twenty-four scenarios presented.184 Instead, subjects 
typically chose “no liability” only for the first four scenarios, 
which were designed to elicit a judgment of full exculpation.185 
For every other scenario, subjects typically expressed an intui-
tion that at least some punishment was deserved. 
As to shared intuitions regarding the relative seriousness 
of wrongdoing, discussed in Part II.B, the amount of agreement 
shown in the study—96% of all pairwise judgments, and a 
Kendall’s W of 0.95—represents an extraordinary result. To 
appreciate its significance, consider some points of comparison. 
For example, American men who ranked the attractiveness of 
women with different waist-to-hip ratios (WHRs) generally 
agreed in their rankings, showing a Kendall’s W of 0.54.186 
Readers of a travel magazine asked to rank eight travel desti-
nations—such as Israel, New York, and Canada—according to 
the risk of terror generally agreed in their rankings, with a 
Kendall’s W of 0.52.187 On the other hand, when economists 
 
Age: 20 or under 2%, 21–30 11%, 31–40 5%, 41–50 11%, 51–60 22%, 
61 or over 47% 
Political orientation: very liberal 5%, liberal 27%, somewhat liberal 
28%, center 17%, somewhat conservative 14%, conservative 9% 
Religion: Jewish 11%, Protestant 77%, other Christian 9%, other 2% 
Level of religious activity: very active 47%, active 25%, somewhat ac-
tive 19%, not active 8% 
Income (annual in thousands): 20–40 5%, 40–60 16%, 60–80 6%, 80–
100 19%, more than 100 31% 
 184. See infra Appendix A (reporting instructions to the participants). 
 185. See supra Table 1. In these four scenarios, the act that caused harm 
was either unintentional (a mistake or a hallucination), coerced, or self-
defense. For more on the scenarios’ analysis, see infra Appendix B. 
 186. Frank Marlowe & Adam Westman, Preferred Waist-to-Hip Ratio and 
Ecology, 30 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 481, 483 (2001). 
 187. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments 
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were asked to rank the top twenty economic journals according 
to quality, the Kendall’s W was 0.095.188 
Very high Kendall’s W scores typically are found only in 
tasks that seem quite obvious, as when subjects are asked to 
rank order images according to their brightness, yielding a 
Kendall’s W of 0.95,189 or, to take another example, when sub-
jects are asked to rank the following six drawings of faces ac-
cording to how much pain they show, giving a Kendall’s W of 
0.97.190 
Figure 1: Faces Pain Scale 
 
One may wonder how this amount of agreement could exist 
when judging such a complex matter as relative blameworthi-
ness. It would seem to call for a matter of complex and subjec-
tive judgment—like judging the relative talent of twenty movie 
actors or athletes, the beauty of twenty flower arrangements or 
paintings, the awkwardness of twenty embarrassing situations, 
 
and Choices, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1301, 1303 (2004). 
 188. Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: 
An Analysis of Journal Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1402, 
1421 (2003) (“These results unveil significant diversity in the journal 
quality perceptions among groups of economists despite the fact that our 
sample focused on AEA members. To test the robustness of this claim, us-
ing Kendall’s W we examined the correlation in journal quality percep-
tions between any two randomly selected economists in our sample. We 
found Kendall’s W for the top ten journals in our rankings to be 0.396, 
which demonstrates a relatively low level of agreement among economists. 
Once we extended this exercise to the top 20 journals in our rankings, 
Kendall’s W dropped to only 0.095.”). 
 189. Charles M.M. de Weert & Noud A.W.H. van Kruysbergen, Assimila-
tion: Central and Peripheral Effects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1221 (1997). The 
images are made up of black and white splotches. Id. at 1222–24. The more 
white splotches, the brighter the image appears. Id. at 1224. 
 190. Keela A. Herr et al., Evaluation of the Faces Pain Scale for Use with 
the Elderly, 14 CLINICAL J. PAIN 29, 29 (1998) (“Rank ordering tasks for the 
individual faces demonstrated near-perfect agreement between the actual ex-
pected ranking and the ranking produced by the subjects (Kendall’s W 
= .97).”). The faces are used to collect diagnostic information from patients 
who are unable to communicate orally. See Pediatric Pain Sourcebook, Sub-
mission and Review Form, http://painsourcebook.ca/pdfs/pps92.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2007). 
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or the humorousness of twenty comedians or clowns. How is it 
that, in contrast, people can agree so much with one another 
when asked to judge the relative punishment deserved in 
twenty-four crime scenarios, a task that would seem to involve 
equally complex matters of judgment? The existence of this 
level of agreement presents an intriguing puzzle in itself.191 
B. EXTENT OF AGREEMENT: STUDY 2 
In a follow-up study, 246 subjects rank-ordered the same 
twenty-four scenarios using a computer-based program over the 
Internet.192 Despite the potential for a large increase in the 
amount of “noise,” the results were essentially the same.193 
1. Method 
In the computer-based test, each Internet participant 
would “drag” each scenario to that location in a “stack” of sce-
narios that reflected the proper rank of the scenario with re-
gard to the amount of punishment deserved. As in the paper-
based administration, subjects were free to identify any or all 
scenarios as deserving of no punishment. 
Study 2 was conducted through the National Science 
Foundation’s Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences 
(TESS) program.194 This method resulted in some important 
differences with respect to the study described above. First, 
subjects were recruited using a random sampling procedure 
which draws broadly from across the United States. As can be 
demonstrated by the demographic data presented below, sub-
jects came from a variety of socioeconomic, religious, and racial 
backgrounds.195 Participants were presented with a web-based 
 
 191. We attempt a preliminary answer to that puzzle in Paul H. Robinson, 
Robert Kurzban & Owen Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
 192. The responses of four of the 250 subjects were excluded from the data-
set because they did not follow the task instructions or because their responses 
were essentially random. With these four cases included, the Kendall’s W for 
the full 250 subjects is 0.86.  
 193. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 194. Data collected by Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences 
(TESS), National Science Foundation Grant 0094964, Diana C. Mutz, Princi-
pal Investigator. Award Abstract #0094964, http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/ 
showAward.do?AwardNumber=0094964 (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). 
 195. See infra note 199. Polimetrix Information implemented and com-
pleted the present data collection. Information about their quota sampling 
technique is available online at Polimetrix: The Science of Political Measure-
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interface that asked them to perform the same task described 
above. Of course, because no experimenter was present at the 
time the task was performed, there is substantially increased 
potential for “noise,” as there is no way to directly observe 
whether subjects were attending to the task. The motivation of 
subjects when they sit in front of a computer terminal may be 
considerably less than when they have face-to-face contact with 
a human researcher. For a task that demands as much time 
and concentration as the rank ordering of twenty-four scenar-
ios, the lack of personal motivation, as well as the lack of qual-
ity control that comes from personal observation, meant that 
the resulting data could be quite “noisy.” 
There were indications that these concerns were well-
founded. Many of the subjects gave results that would seem in-
explicable to the vast majority of their fellow participants. For 
example, one subject ranked the offender who shortchanged the 
customer of twenty dollars in Scenario 7 as deserving of more 
punishment than the offender who did the vicious stabbing in 
Scenario 20, and ranked the T-shirt theft in Scenario 6 as de-
serving of more punishment than the ransom, rape, torture, 
and strangling in Scenario 24. Is it likely that this subject un-
derstood the instructions and was taking the task seriously? 
Another subject ranked the person who stole the camera be-
cause he was coerced to do so by a threat to his child, in Sce-
nario 2—judged as deserving no punishment by most sub-
jects—as deserving of more punishment than the brutal 
abduction and killing in Scenario 22. Another subject thought 
that taking the clock radio from the car, in Scenario 8, deserved 
more punishment than the beating of the victim with a club 
during a robbery in Scenario 17, and that the head-butt causing 
a gash requiring stitches, in Scenario 13, deserved less pun-
ishment than taking pies from the all-you-can-eat buffet in 
Scenario 5. None of these subjects’ responses was excluded from 
the dataset. 
A final difference with the previous study is that a slightly 
different set of demographic questions was administered at the 
conclusion of the study. These demographic items in addition to 
a few other items are routinely gathered by Polimetrix. 
 
ment, http://www.polimetrix.com/services_sample.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2007). 
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2. Results 
Table 3 presents the scenarios in the modal order of the 
participants as a group. As in paper-based Study 1, the first 
four scenarios were typically ranked as not deserving punish-
ment. Scenario 5 was seen as a borderline case for which sub-
jects disagreed about whether punishment was deserved but 
agreed that it should be ranked as more aggravated than the 
four “no punishment” scenarios but less aggravated than the 
other nineteen scenarios. As with Table 1, mean ranks in ordi-
nal data obviously have limited usefulness but are provided 
here simply to give a heuristic sense of the distribution for each 
scenario. 
 
Table 3: Summary Data from Study 2 
Scenario Modal Rank % Assigning Mean Rank 
  “No Liability” 
S1  (defending) no punish 82 ∗ 
S2  (coercion) no punish 75 ∗ 
S3  (umbrella) no punish 87 ∗ 
S4  (hallucination) no punish 71 ∗ 
S5  (pies) 5 8 5.4 
S7  (short change) 6 6 7.1 
S6  (T-shirt) 7 1 7.4 
S8  (radio) 8 0 8.4 
S9  (drill) 9 0 9.2 
S10  (microwave) 10 0 10.2 
S11  (TV) 11 0 10.6 
S12  (slap) 12 0 11.6 
S13  (head-butt) 13 2 12.2 
S14  (stitches) 14 0 13.7 
S15  (necklace) 15 0 13.6 
S16  (robbery) 16 0 15.3 
S17  (clubbing) 17 1 16.7 
S18  (pit bulls) 18 0 17.8 
S19  (infant) 19 1 19.0 
S20  (stabbing) 20 0 20.1 
S21  (ambush) 21 0 20.9 
S22  (abduction) 22 0 21.4 
S23  (burning) 23 0 22.2 
S24  (ransom) 24 0 23.5 
N = 246 
∗  The means for these four scenarios are 1.2, 2.3, 0.3, 1.7, respectively, when 
a response of “no punishment” is given a value of 0. Mean ranks in ordinal data ob-
viously have limited usefulness but are provided here simply to give a heuristic 
sense of the distribution for each scenario, and to establish the modal relative rela-
tion among the scenarios for the layout of Table 4. 
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As in the previous study, the first four scenarios were 
judged to merit “no punishment” by an overwhelming propor-
tion of subjects: 82%, 75%, 87%, and 71% for the four scenarios 
respectively.196 Table 4 lists the remaining twenty scenarios in 
increasing order based on the subject group’s modal ranking. 
As with Table 2, each cell shows the frequencies with which 
subjects deviated from the group’s modal ranking of each pair 
of scenarios. 
 
Table 4: Deviations from Modal Ranks in Study 2 
   S5 S7 S6 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 
 S5  0 59 54 30 26 19 13 12 15 7 12 4 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 
 S7   0 117 82 54 47 48 27 27 17 16 8 4 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 
 S6    0 79 61 43 46 28 31 15 14 8 6 3 5 1 1 1 1 2 
 S8     0 78 52 49 43 42 18 27 10 7 4 7 2 0 1 2 2 
 S9      0 74 62 53 52 32 32 12 8 3 5 1 0 0 0 1 
 S10       0 100 66 61 36 40 13 9 5 6 3 1 2 2 3 
 S11        0 75 67 43 41 18 8 6 4 2 1 1 1 2 
 S12         0 84 43 62 18 9 7 8 1 1 1 1 1 
 S13          0 67 87 36 18 9 12 2 1 1 2 2 
 S14           0 117 65 23 14 19 2 0 0 1 1 
 S15            0 64 36 15 19 1 2 2 1 1 
 S16             0 57 33 23 3 0 1 2 2 
 S17              0 62 43 13 4 3 6 5 
 S18               0 64 30 20 16 6 4 
 S19                0 90 61 52 37 12 
 S20                 0 76 54 35 10 
 S21                  0 85 58 18 
 S22                   0 66 19 
 S23                    0 33 
 S24                     0 
N = 64 
NB: Shading indicates instances where adjacent scenarios were “flipped” by subjects in their rankings. 
 
Each of the 246 subjects could have deviated from the 
group modal ranking as to each of the 190 pairwise judg-
ments—the number of cells on the table—for a total number of 
46,740 possible deviations from modal pairwise ranking. Recall 
that if a subject ranks a single scenario different from the mo-
dal ranking, that choice may produce many pairwise “devia-
tions.” The subjects had a total of 4317 deviations, meaning 
that the subjects reversed the modal pairwise ranking only 9.2% 
of the time. That is, they agreed with the pairwise modal rank 
 
 196. Overall, 79% of the time subjects agreed that no punishment was de-
served in these four scenarios. The 246 subjects each judged these four scenar-
ios—a total of 984 judgments—and in 774 instances concluded that no pun-
ishment was deserved. 
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91.8% of the time, as compared to the roughly 50% agreement 
rate that a random ranking of pairs would give.197 
The most common deviation, as one might guess, was for a 
subject to “flip” the ranking of two scenarios that were adjacent 
in the group’s modal ranking—for example, a subject rank or-
dering the scenarios as S6, S8, S7, S9, “flipping” scenarios S7 
and S8. There were 1447 such “adjacent flip” deviations, ac-
counting for about a third of all deviations. If these simple 
“flips” of adjacent scenarios are excluded, the percentage of 
pairwise rankings that deviate from the mode is only 6.1%. 
As in paper-based Study 1, we calculated a Kendall’s coef-
ficient of concordance for the subjects rankings. Recall that a 
coefficient of 1.0 indicates perfect agreement, a 0.0 indicates no 
agreement.198 For the 246 subjects rank-ordering the twenty-
four scenarios, the Kendall’s W is 0.88 (with p < 0.001), again, a 
surprisingly high level of agreement. 
The participants in the computer-based study were quite 
diverse.199 Table 5 shows the modes for some of the more im-
portant demographic groups. 
 
 197. Remember, if subjects were responding randomly to the pairwise com-
parisons, they would agree 50% of the time, so the point of comparison here is 
the amount over 50%, not over 0%. 
 198. See ZAR, supra note 180, at 390. 
 199. The participant group looks like this: 
Gender: male 50%, female 50% 
Race: white 70%, black 4%, Hispanic 6%, Native American 1%, mixed 
5%, other 4% 
Age: 20 or under 6%, 21–30 15%, 31–40 21%, 41–50 18%, 51–60 17%, 
61 or over 23% 
Marital status: single 23%, married 61%, divorced 8%, widowed 4%, 
domestic partnership 4%, separated 2% 
Have children?: yes 64%, no 36% 
Education: no high school degree 4%, high school graduate 18%, some 
college 47%, two-year college degree 7%, four-year college degree 14%, 
graduate degree 10% 
Political orientation: very liberal 11%, liberal 20%, moderate 38%, 
conservative 22%, very conservative 9% 
Religion: Jewish 4%, Protestant 33%, Muslim 4%, Catholic 2%, no re-
ligion 23%, other 18% 
Level of religious activity: very active 22%, active 11%, somewhat ac-
tive 18%, not active 49% 
Income (annual in thousands): less than 20 8%, 20–40 16%, 40–60 
18%, 60–80 14%, 80–100 8%, over 100 20%, decline to answer 17% 
Registered to vote?: yes 95%, no 5% 
Strength of political views: strong Democrat 20%, Democrat 10%, 
leaning Democrat 8%, independent 18%, leaning Republican 7%, Re-
publican 10%, strong Republican 17%, not sure 9% 
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Table 5: Modal Rankings Broken Down by Demographics, Study 2 
Scenario All   Non-  <$60K >$60K <2 yr ≥2 yr 
 Subjects Male Female White White Income∗ Income∗DegreeDegree 
N = 246 123 123 53 193 102 103 169 77 
S1  (defending) 0† 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S2  (coercion) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S3  (umbrella) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S4  (hallucination) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S5  (pies) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
S7  (short change) 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 
S6  (T-shirt) 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 
S8  (radio) 8 8 8 7,8‡ 8 8 8 8 8 
S9  (drill) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
S10  (microwave) 10 10 11 11 10 11 10 11 10 
S11  (TV) 11 11 11 8 11 11 11 11 11 
S12  (slap) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
S13  (head-butt) 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
S14  (stitches) 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 
S15  (necklace) 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 
S16  (robbery) 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
S17  (clubbing) 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
S18  (pit bulls) 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
S19  (infant) 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
S20  (stabbing) 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
S21  (ambush) 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
S22  (abduction) 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
S23  (burning) 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
S24  (ransom) 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
∗  Forty-one subjects did not provide income information. 
†  “No punishment” as the modal response is shown as 0. 
‡  The two ranks were a tie, thus both modes are reported. 
 
There appears to be little variation in the modes of sce-
nario rankings according to these demographic variables.200 
Given the high level of agreement, it would be difficult to find 
variations in rankings as a function of demographic groups.201 
 
Libertarian: not at all 60%, a little 24%, somewhat 40%, very 15%, ex-
tremely 4%, decline to answer 1% 
 200. An investigation of the other demographic variables on which data 
was collected from the subjects—political party, ideology, marital status, 
whether they have children, religion, level of religious activity, libertarian-
ism—showed a similar lack of any meaningful difference between demo-
graphic groups’ modal rankings. TESS Demographic Modes Table (on file with 
the authors). 
 201. We plan to examine this issue using more sophisticated statistical 
analyses. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
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3. Discussion 
The results of computer-based Study 2 reinforce the con-
clusions of paper-based Study 1. Both studies show an excep-
tionally high level of agreement among the participants. The 
result in Study 2 is all the more surprising given the great po-
tential for “noise” in a study where researchers cannot super-
vise or even observe the participants as they perform the task. 
The subjects agreed with the modal pairwise ranking 92% of 
the time and, if the “flips” of adjacent scenarios are excluded, 
they agreed with the modal pairwise ranking 94% of the time. 
The Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance was 0.88. This result 
confirms the astounding level of agreement shown by Study 1’s 
Kendall’s W of 0.95, in performing what appears to be a rather 
complex and subjective judgment task. 
IV.  DISAGREEMENTS ON INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE  
Disagreements on intuitions of justice do exist. Some of the 
apparent disagreements are not real, but the studies reported 
below suggest that true disagreements do exist for intuitions 
about wrongdoing outside the core of physical aggression, un-
consented-to takings, and deception or deceit in exchanges. 
A. APPARENT DISAGREEMENTS AMONG INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 
People obviously do disagree about many things relating to 
crime and punishment, as the endless public debates make 
clear. What can be said about the issues on which there is 
agreement and the issues on which there is not? 
Some apparent sources of disagreement are simply mis-
leading. For example, poor testing methods will predictably 
underestimate the extent of agreement. As noted previously, 
when a test scenario is written ambiguously so that different 
test participants perceive it differently, the existence of shared 
intuitions of justice itself will predict different judgments 
among the participants.202 So too, when a case in the headlines 
has social or political implications, it is common that its rele-
vant facts will be perceived differently by different people. 
What one makes of the police testimony in the O.J. Simpson 
case or the Rodney King case may depend upon one’s experi-
ences and one’s peers’ experiences with police officers in daily 
life. If people draw different conclusions from the testimony, 
 
 202. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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they may have different views of the relevant facts of the case, 
which would predict different views on the liability and pun-
ishment deserved. 
Another source of apparent disagreement has been men-
tioned above.203 While people may agree on the relative blame-
worthiness of a set of cases, some people may prefer generally 
harsher punishments than other people.204 That is, some people 
may set the most severe end of the punishment continuum no-
ticeably higher than others, which would predict different sen-
tences, even if the people agreed on the relative blameworthi-
ness of different offenders. 
There is evidence that attitudes towards the severity of 
punishment generally vary with some demographics, such as 
race and socioeconomic status. For example, whites have been 
found to support the death penalty more than blacks.205 Simi-
larly, whites are more supportive of “three strikes” laws.206 Re-
ligious variables also have effects on issues such as the death 
penalty, though their effects are not straightforward.207 Gener-
ally, women have been found to be less punitive than men.208 
Data from Canada and elsewhere indicate that people with less 
education and lower incomes compared to those with more edu-
cation and higher income tend to be more punitive in the sense 
that they report that sentences are “not severe enough,”209 
 
 203. See supra Part II.B. 
 204. See supra Part II.B. 
 205. Robert L. Young, Race, Conceptions of Crime and Justice, and Support 
for the Death Penalty, 54 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 67, 67 (1991). 
 206. Yesilernis L. Peña et al., Race and Support for the Criminal Justice 
System: A Matter of Asymmetry 29 tbl.1 (Russell Sage Found., Working Paper 
No. 181, 2002), available at http://www.russellsage.org/publications/ 
workingpapers/Race%20and%20Support%20for%20the%20Criminal%20Justice% 
20System/document. 
 207. Robert L. Young, Religious Orientation, Race and Support for the 
Death Penalty, 31 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 76, 82 (1992) (“Membership in a 
fundamentalist church and belief in Biblical literalism increased support, 
while evangelism was associated with reduced support.”). 
 208. Felicia Pratto et al., The Gender Gap: Differences in Political Attitudes 
and Social Dominance Orientation, 36 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49 (1997) 
(“Results [from a recent study] replicate previous findings of more male sup-
port of conservative ideology, military programmes, and punitive poli-
cies . . . .”). 
 209. Carla Cesaroni & Anthony N. Doob, The Decline in Support for Penal 
Welfarism: Evidence of Support Among the Elite for Punitive Segregation, 43 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 434, 438 (2003). 
ROBINSON_KURZBAN_4FMT 6/15/2007 10:58:24 AM 
1882 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1829 
 
though the role of education on policies relating to punitiveness 
is somewhat complex.210 
The same differences are seen cross-culturally. Average 
prison sentences vary widely from nation to nation. American 
offenders were required to serve an average of twenty-nine 
months after conviction in 1999.211 In contrast, the average of-
fender in the Netherlands was released after five months,212 
while Columbian offenders were not released until a startling 
mean of 140 months.213 Moreover, even within a culture, com-
munity attitudes toward punishment severity can vary over 
time.214 The effect of these different views on sentencing sever-
ity generally can be to obscure agreement on the relative 
blameworthiness of specific cases. 
Another effect that exaggerates the extent of disagreement 
is the abstraction and politicalization process. When people are 
asked whether they support or oppose the death penalty, for 
example, their answers may be different from when the ques-
tion is posed in terms of a specific set of facts with a specific of-
fender and victim.215 This phenomenon has direct analogs in 
other areas of psychology. When persons in need are identified 
individuals, for which specific and concrete information is pro-
vided, people are more likely to help them than when such in-
formation is not provided.216 Stereotypes are more commonly 
 
 210. Michael J. Leiber et al., The Effects of Occupation and Education on 
Punitive Orientations Among Juvenile Justice Personnel, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 
303, 303 (2002) (showing that for the sample studied—juvenile justice person-
nel—“[i]ncreases in education reduced adherence to punishment orienta-
tions”). For an interesting discussion and recent data, see Christopher M. 
Federico & Justin W. Holmes, Education and the Interface Between Racial 
Perceptions and Criminal Justice Attitudes, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 47 (2005). 
 211. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, SEVENTH UNITED 
NATIONS SURVEY ON CRIME TRENDS AND THE OPERATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEMS 480 (1998–2000). 
 212. Id. at 308. 
 213. Id. at 66. 
 214. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 137 (1996) (noting 
that the average prison sentence for violent offenses in the United States tri-
pled between 1975 and 1989). 
 215. See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 76 (2005) (suggesting that people imagine de-
fendants to be more dangerous than the typical defendant when polling ques-
tions are phrased in an abstract way). 
 216. Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identi-
fied Group, or Just a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 
163 (2005); see also Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim 
or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
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applied to groups—for example, black males—than to specific 
individuals in the category.217 In both of these cases, as with 
the death penalty, the difference between the specific and the 
abstract changes responses.218 Hence, when a criminal pun-
ishment issue or case takes on a broader public profile, one’s 
view on it often carries baggage that can distort what a person 
would otherwise see as her intuition of justice. 
B. TRUE DISAGREEMENTS AMONG INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE: 
STUDIES 3 AND 4 
Notwithstanding these many false appearances of dis-
agreements among intuitions of justice, it is true that there are 
punishment-assignment issues on which people do indeed dis-
agree. Two additional studies, using the same participant pools 
as Studies 1 and 2 above, illustrate the potential for disagree-
ment and may hint at its source. 
1. Method: Studies 3 and 4 
After completing the paper-based rank ordering of the 
twenty-four scenarios of Study 1, participants were given an 
additional twelve scenarios.219 The methodology was the same 
as used in Study 1: Each scenario was printed on a separate 
card, which the participants were asked to rank order on a 
large table according to the amount of punishment deserved, if 
any.220 In addition, participants were asked to show how the 
punishment deserved in these twelve scenarios compared to 
that in the first set of twenty-four scenarios, by laying the 
twelve new cards out on the table next to the original twenty-
four cards, using the placement of the card to indicate the 
 
5, 13 (2003) (“In combination, these two studies provide new evidence support-
ing the existence of an identifiable victim effect.”). 
 217. See Michael J. Gill, Biased Against “Them” More Than “Him”: Stereo-
type Use in Group-Directed and Individual-Directed Judgments, 21 SOC. COG-
NITION 321, 321 (2003) (“Stereotypes predicted group-directed social policy 
judgments but showed little relation to individual-directed impression or so-
cial policy judgments.”). 
 218. There are other similar effects. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Fram-
ing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 35, 40 (1993) (noting that, for example, people are more willing to pay 
for insurance against something that is concrete and specific rather than 
something stated more abstractly: “The total price [of insurance that the sub-
jects were willing to pay] reported for disease and then accident protection is 
more than twice that reported for protection for ‘any reason.’”).  
 219. The text of the twelve scenarios is reproduced in infra Appendix C. 
 220. See infra Appendix A. 
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proper punishment in relation to the previously ranked scenar-
ios. Participants could place the twelve new scenarios either 
next to or between the previously ranked twenty-four scenarios. 
The twelve scenarios of this second group included offenses 
of drunk driving, prostitution, marijuana purchase, purchase of 
alcohol for use by teenagers, bestiality, late-term abortion, co-
caine purchase, date rape, third felony offense (jewelry grab), 
large-scale cocaine selling, and very large-scale cocaine impor-
tation and distribution.221 While a majority of these offenses 
are committed with much lower frequency than the offenses in 
Study 1,222 they are each in their own turn an offense on which 
there has been public debate. 
In the final study, Study 4, the same participants who had 
ranked the first twenty-four scenarios using the Internet-based 
procedures in Study 2 now ranked the same additional twelve 
scenarios used in paper-based Study 3 described above. In the 
Internet version, however, participants simply ranked the 
twelve scenarios among themselves, without indicating how 
they compared to the twenty-four scenarios they had previously 
ranked in Study 2. This was largely a concession to logistic 
limitations of the web-based interface. 
2. Study 3 Results 
Table 6 lists the scenarios in the order in which the sub-
jects as a group ranked them, according to mean rank. Recall 
that the subjects are using their ranking of the first set of 
twenty-four scenarios as their “rank calibration,” in ranking 
this second set of twelve scenarios. Thus, the point of reference 
for understanding the ranks in Table 6 below is the ranks es-
tablished in Study 1, presented in the second column of Table 
3. The lettering of the scenarios indicates the order of serious-
ness as reflected in the statutory penalties commonly associ-
ated with each offense, as illustrated in Appendix D. Scenario A 
typically carries the lowest statutory penalty, scenario L the 
highest. 
 
 221. See infra Appendix C. 
 222. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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Table 6: Summary Data from Study 3 
Scenario Mean Rank∗ Mode Rank % Assigning 
  (frequency)† “No Liability” 
E  (bestiality) 5.1 no punish (27) 42.2 
B  (prostitution) 7.3 no punish (15) 23.4 
C  (marijuana) 7.4 no punish (14) 21.9 
G  (cocaine) 10.2 11–12 (9) 9.4 
A  (drunk crash) 12.0 11–12 (9) 3.1 
D  (teen alcohol) 12.2 17–18 (10) 4.7 
I  (3rd theft) 13.6 11–12 (12) 0.0 
F  (late abortion) 14.0 no punish, 17–18 (8) 12.5 
H  (unwanted sex) 15.5 17–18 (17) 1.6 
K  (cocaine dealer) 16.5 17–18 (21) 3.1 
L  (cocaine importer) 17.4 17–18 (24) 0.0 
J  (rape) 18.6 17–18 (18) 0.0 
N = 64 
∗  Recall that subjects’ ranks in this Study relied upon the rankings they had 
given in the first set of scenarios, in Study 1. As noted in the context of Table 1, 
mean ranks in ordinal data obviously have limited usefulness but are provided here 
simply to give a heuristic sense of the distribution for each scenario and to estab-
lish the modal relative relation among the scenarios for the layout of Table 7. For 
example, the 18.6 mean rank for scenario J suggests that subjects most closely as-
sociated this scenario with the seriousness of scenarios 18 and 19 of Study 1. 
†  A mode of 11–12 on the table indicates that the most common subject 
response was to rank the scenario as being between the scenarios in the first 
set that she had ranked as 11th and 12th. The number in parentheses 
indicates the number of subjects who gave that modal response. 
 
Note the low number of responses that created the modal 
response for each scenario, suggesting that the responses were 
quite scattered. 
Using this mean ranking to order the scenarios according 
to their relative seriousness as perceived by the subjects, Table 
7 follows this order in setting scenarios along its two axes. The 
body of the Table shows the frequencies with which subjects’ 
judgments about the ranking of each scenario differed from this 
order of ranking. The Table contains the same kind of informa-
tion as shown in Tables 2 and 4 previously: the frequencies 
with which subjects reversed their ordering from that of the 
group as a whole. 
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Table 7: Deviations from Modal Ranks in Study 3 
Scenario E B C G A D I F H K L J 
E  (bestiality) 0 14 15 9 5 6 4 4 3 3 3 0 
B  (prostitution)  0 19 7 7 6 4 8 4 4 2 0 
C  (marijuana)   0 02 7 5 10 8 3 0 0 1 
G  (cocaine)    0 14 12 13 13 8 1 0 0 
A  (drunk crash)     0 23 20 19 10 7 3 4 
D  (teen alcohol)      0 20 18 10 4 3 1 
I  (3rd theft)       0 23 14 7 3 1 
F  (late abortion)        0 28 24 20 1 
H  (unwanted sex)         0 18 15 2 
K  (cocaine dealer)          0 02 8 
L  (cocaine importer)           0 14 
J  (rape)            0 
N = 64 
NB: Shading indicates instances where adjacent scenarios were “flipped” in 
their rankings. 
 
Each of the sixty-four subjects could have deviated from 
the group modal ranking as to each of the sixty-six pairwise 
judgments—the number of cells on the table—for a total num-
ber of 4224 possible deviations from modal pairwise ranking. 
Recall that if a subject ranks a single scenario different from 
the group’s overall ranking it may produce many pairwise de-
viations. The subjects had a total of 561 deviations, meaning 
that the subjects reversed the overall group’s pairwise ranking 
13.3% of the time, as compared to the roughly 50% disagree-
ment rate one would see for a random ranking of pairs.223 This 
suggests more than three times the 4% disagreement rate 
among the same subjects when they ranked the first set of 
twenty-four scenarios in Study 1. A similar implication might 
be drawn from the fact that the standard deviations of the rank 
means in the second set of twelve scenarios are higher than 
those for the first set of twenty-four scenarios,224 even though 
they should be lower by virtue of the smaller number of scenar-
ios. 
Again, this analysis of pairwise comparisons, rank-mode 
frequencies, and standard deviations of mean ranks is designed 
only to give the reader an overview of the data. The more reli-
 
 223. Remember, if subjects were responding randomly, the subjects would 
agree in their pairwise comparison roughly 50% of the time.  
 224. Hand Run Standard Deviations Table (on file with the authors). The 
standard deviations of means in this context are particularly unreliable, how-
ever, because the subjects for Study 3 used their Study 1 rankings as their 
baseline. 
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able and sophisticated analysis is the use of Kendall’s W coeffi-
cient of concordance, which measures agreement among sets of 
rank orderings. Recall that a W of 1.0 indicates perfect agree-
ment, while 0.0 indicates no agreement.225 For the twelve sce-
narios in Study 3, the Kendall’s W is 0.55 (p < 0.001),226 as 
compared to the Kendall’s W of 0.95 for the same participants 
ranking the twenty-four Study 1 scenarios. Whether the dis-
agreements shown here are influenced in part by demographic 
differences among subjects is an interesting question that we 
are planning to explore.227 
3. Study 4 Results 
Table 8 shows the mean rankings of the same twelve sce-
narios as ranked by the 246 subjects who did Internet-based 
rankings for Study 4. Remember that in this study, as opposed 
to paper-based Study 3, the subjects ranked the twelve scenar-
ios among themselves, and not in relation to the twenty-four 
scenarios they had previously ranked for Study 2. Thus, the 
mean rankings in Table 8 can be compared to an ideal set of 
mean rankings from 1 to 12. 
 
 
 225. See ZAR, supra note 180, at 390. 
 226. N = 64; Chi-square = 389.39; df = 11. 
 227. Full analyses of this data would require sophisticated procedures be-
yond the scope of the present Article. Work is currently underway to answer 
the question of whether the demographic variables might predict differences 
in how scenarios are ranked. In particular, using a series of ordered probit re-
gressions, we can determine for each offense whether the ranking of that of-
fense varies as a function of the value of the demographic and other response 
variables collected during the survey. For example, because we collected data 
on gender, we can determine whether the gender of the subject correlates with 
the ranking given the “bestiality” scenario. By comparing the number of sce-
narios that are ranked statistically significantly different from one another as 
a function of questionnaire items, we can draw inferences about the extent to 
which demographics and political views influence evaluations of different of-
fenses. We are planning to conduct further analyses on this dataset, Crime & 
Punishment Study, which is on file with the authors. 
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Table 8: Summary Data from Study 4 
Scenario Mean Rank∗ Modal Rank % Assigning 
   “No Liability” 
C  (marijuana) 2.2 † 33 
B  (prostitution) 2.4 † 30 
G  (cocaine) 4.0 † 19 
E  (bestiality) 4.2 † 16 
D  (teen alcohol) 4.8 5 6 
A  (drunk crash) 6.2 6 0 
I  (3rd theft) 7.1 7 0 
F  (late abortion) 7.5 12 11 
K  (cocaine dealer) 7.9 9 6 
H  (unwanted sex) 8.7 11 1 
L  (cocaine importer) 8.9 10 6 
J  (rape) 11.1 12 0 
N = 246 
∗  As noted previously, mean ranks in ordinal data obviously have limited 
usefulness but are provided simply to give a heuristic sense of the distribution for 
each scenario and to establish the relative relation among the scenarios for the lay-
out of Table 9. 
†  These scenarios had a modal rank of “no punishment.” 
 
Using the mean group ranking in Table 8 to order the sce-
narios along each axis, Table 9 shows the frequencies with 
which subjects’ judgments about the ranking of each scenario 
pair differed from that of the group’s modal ranking of the pair. 
 
Table 9: Deviations from Modal Ranks in Study 4 
Scenario C B G E D A I F K H L J 
C  (marijuana) 0 99 25 84 51 39 22 26 5 19 5 6 
B  (prostitution)  0 52 74 56 39 24 29 11 17 10 5 
G  (cocaine)   0 122 107 78 48 51 9 35 6 6 
E  (bestiality)    0 97 74 54 59 50 32 44 10 
D  (teen alcohol)     0 88 63 68 34 31 22 9 
A  (drunk crash)      0 91 99 59 56 48 13 
I  (3rd theft)       0 110 82 67 58 14 
F  (late abortion)        0 122 107 115 62 
K  (cocaine dealer)         0 92 38 32 
H  (unwanted sex)          0 133 21 
L  (cocaine importer)           0 48 
J  (rape)            0 
N = 246 
NB: Shading indicates instances where adjacent scenarios were “flipped” in 
their rankings. 
 
Each of the 246 subjects could have deviated from the 
group modal ranking as to each of the sixty-six pairwise judg-
ments—the number of cells on the table—for a total number of 
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16,236 possible deviations from modal pairwise ranking. The 
subjects had a total of 3362 deviations, meaning that the sub-
jects reversed the overall group’s pairwise ranking 20.7% of the 
time, as compared to the roughly 50% disagreement rate one 
would see for a random ranking of pairs.228 This result is no-
ticeably higher than the 9.2% rate of disagreement among the 
same subjects when they ranked the first set of twenty-four 
scenarios, in Study 2. 
Table 10 compares the standard deviation of the mean 
ranks of the twenty-four scenarios in Study 2 to the standard 
deviation of the mean ranks when the same 246 subjects 
ranked the twelve scenarios in Study 4. All other things being 
equal, for a scenario set of twelve scenarios in Study 4, the 
standard deviations for a scenario set of twenty-four scenarios 
in Study 3 should be roughly half of those for the smaller first 
set. 
 
Table 10: Variation in Mean Ranks for Studies 2 and 4 
 Standard  Standard 
24 Scenarios Deviaion of 12 Scenarios Deviation of 
of Study 2 Mean Rank of Study 4 Mean Rank 
S1  (defending) 3.2 C  (marijuana) 2.3 
S2  (coercion) 5.4 B  (prostitution) 2.4 
S3  (umbrella) 0.9 G  (cocaine) 2.6 
S4  (hallucination) 3.3 E  (bestiality) 3.4 
S5  (pies) 2.4 D  (teen alcohol) 2.5 
S7  (short change) 3.0 A  (drunk crash) 2.4 
S6  (T-shirt) 2.5 I  (3rd theft) 2.4 
S8  (radio) 2.4 F  (late abortion) 4.0 
S9  (drill) 2.4 K  (cocaine dealer) 2.6 
S10  (microwave) 2.7 H  (unwanted sex) 2.7 
S11  (TV) 2.5 L  (cocaine importer) 2.8 
S12  (slap) 2.5 J  (rape) 1.8 
S13  (head-butt) 3.2 
S14  (stitches) 2.5 
S15  (necklace) 3.0 
S16  (robbery) 2.3 
S17  (clubbing) 2.4 
S18  (pit bulls) 2.1 
S19  (infant) 3.2 
S20  (stabbing) 1.6 
S21  (ambush) 1.5 
S22  (abduction) 1.5 
S23  (burning) 1.6 
S24  (ransom) 1.9 
Average SD 2.5 2.7 
 
 228. See supra note 179. 
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Rather than being half the standard deviations of the lar-
ger scenario set for Study 2, the standard deviations for the 
second set of twelve scenarios, are, in fact, higher. The first set 
has an average standard deviation of 2.5. The second set has an 
average standard deviation not of 1.25, but rather of 2.7. 
Again, this analysis of pairwise comparisons, mean ranks, 
and standard deviation of mean ranks is designed only to give 
the reader a general overview of the data. The more reliable 
and sophisticated analysis is the use of Kendall’s W coefficient 
of concordance, which measures agreement among sets of rank 
orderings. For the twelve scenarios in Study 4, the Kendall’s W 
is 0.51 (p < 0.001).229 
4. Discussion 
As compared to the extremely high Kendall’s W of 0.95 and 
0.88 for the twenty-four scenarios in Studies 1 and 2, respec-
tively, the Kendall’s W for the twelve scenarios in these two 
studies, of 0.55 and 0.51, respectively, shows that both paper-
based and Internet-based subjects have considerably less 
agreement on the second set of scenarios than on the first set. 
There is clearly more disagreement among subjects about the 
proper ranking of the Study 3 and 4 scenarios than about the 
proper ranking of the Study 1 and 2 scenarios. Why should this 
be so? 
Each of the second set of offenses has its own story as to 
the reasons for its controversial nature.230 But there may be 
 
 229. N = 246; Chi-square = 1391; df = 11. Whether the disagreements 
shown here are influenced in part by demographic differences among subjects 
is an interesting question that we plan to explore. See supra note 227. 
 230. For example, one arguing for enhanced drunk driving penalties may 
point to the number of serious automobile accidents caused by intoxicated 
drivers, while others may suggest that the existing punishments for impaired 
drivers are disproportionate to the sanctions for similarly reckless conduct, 
such as driving grossly over the speed limit in a residential area. 
Prostitution can be characterized as either a victimless, consensual trans-
action or a serious problem that both disrupts the family and degrades the 
status of women. Likewise, those arguing for strong marijuana purchase sanc-
tions may allude to the social harms caused by marijuana and its status as a 
gateway drug, while others will claim that marijuana use is a similarly victim-
less crime that causes no more social harm than the legal use of alcohol. 
 Respondents claiming that purchasing alcohol for a teenager is a minor 
offense will note the legal status of alcohol for older users and suggest that al-
cohol use by teenagers, when not combined with other conduct such as driving, 
causes no substantial harm. On the other hand, those supporting a more sub-
stantial sentence for such alcohol purchases will assert that teenagers are not 
yet old enough to use alcohol responsibly, and thus such other conduct occurs 
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systematic differences between the kind of scenarios of the first 
set and those of the second set that invite further exploration. 
Note, for example, that the second set of scenarios is different 
from the first set in that it concerns conduct outside the core of 
wrongdoing, which includes physical injury, taking without 
consent, and deception in exchanges. Such wrongs are so cen-
tral to effective group cooperation that they may arise in any 
group in any culture. One might speculate that views about 
punishment of conduct outside the core of wrongdoing may not 
be the product of intuition at all, but rather the product of gen-
eral social learning and reasoning. The more this is true, the 
more the situational context and the demographic characteris-
tic of the subject may shape the punishment judgment. The re-
sults here suggest generally that the closer conduct is to the 
core of physical injury of persons or property, takings without 
consent, and deception in exchanges, the greater will be pre-
sent-day agreement about its relative blameworthiness. The 
 
with regularity once teenagers are provided with liquor. 
Bestiality may be considered either private conduct and, in any case, a 
somewhat trivial offense, or a serious moral transgression and animal cruelty 
issue. If one believes that human life does not begin until birth, a late-term 
abortion may be considered nothing other than a valid exercise of a woman’s 
right to control what happens to her body, while one who believes that life be-
gins at an earlier point may equate a late-term abortion to homicide. Those 
suggesting that significant penalties should be associated with a cocaine pur-
chase will note the often-violent behavior that can be attributed to cocaine us-
ers and the association of cocaine sellers with organized crime, while others 
will assert that cocaine use, in many contexts, is also a victimless crime. 
One may argue that date rape is less serious than forceful rape and may 
claim that much of the punishment resulting from forcible rape can be attrib-
uted to the violence and threat associated with the act and analogize to the 
difference between theft and robbery. Others may suggest that the violation of 
a woman’s dignity, regardless of whether violence is involved, is the same. Ar-
guments in favor of an enhanced sentence after a third felony offense, such as 
jewelry grab, include the need to incapacitate an offender who seemingly can-
not stop committing crimes and a claim that after a first and second convic-
tion, one “should have learned,” while claims against an enhanced sentence 
center on arguments for proportionality and that one’s “punishment should fit 
the crime.” 
The arguments for and against stringent sanctions for large scale cocaine 
selling, and very large scale cocaine importation and distribution, are similar. 
Those in favor of harsher sentences will allude to the association between co-
caine distribution and violent, organized crime and assert that even if cocaine 
use is a victimless crime that only harms the user, those distributing con-
trolled substances are creating the victims. Those in favor of lighter sanctions 
for such offenders may take note of the dire economic conditions from which 
most cocaine distributors come and claim that the harms associated with co-
caine use are exaggerated. 
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more conduct is tied to these fundamental wrongdoings only by 
analogy, the greater will be the disagreement over its serious-
ness, to an extent that reflects the disagreement over the 
strength of the analogy.231 
  CONCLUSION  
As the previous sections have demonstrated, contrary to 
common wisdom, available evidence suggests that human in-
tuitions of justice about core wrongdoing—both the sense that 
serious wrongdoing should be punished and the sense of the 
relative seriousness of wrongdoing—are deep, predictable, and 
widely shared. While there are disagreements about the rela-
tive blameworthiness of wrongdoing outside the core, the core 
wrongs themselves—physical aggression, takings without con-
sent, and deception in exchanges—are the subject of nuanced 
and specific intuitions that cut across demographics. 
The existence of such shared intuitions of justice may have 
important implications for criminal justice debates, including 
abolition of punishment, distribution of punishment according 
to principles that conflict with the community’s shared intui-
tions of justice, and programs to change people’s views on what 
constitutes serious wrongdoing. While a full account of these 
implications is another project,232 consider the possibilities. 
For example, it may be unrealistic to expect the population 
to all “rise above” its desire to punish wrongdoers, or to expect 
the government to “reeducate” people away from their interest 
in punishing wrongdoers, as is urged by some reformers. It 
seems unlikely that social engineering can change the shared 
intuition that serious wrongdoing should be punished, at least 
not through methods short of the kind of coercive indoctrina-
tion that liberal democracies would find unacceptable. If the in-
tuition to punish serious wrongdoing were subject to easy ma-
nipulation, one would expect to find differences in this intuition 
among different contexts and demographics. Given the near 
universality of this intuition across societies and demographics, 
it is logical to assume that this intuition is insulated from the 
influence of the society and the situation. 
 
 231. We explore these issues further in Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra 
note 191. 
 232. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implica-
tions for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2008). 
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For another example, a criminal justice system that regu-
larly fails to do justice or that regularly does injustice, as 
judged by the community’s shared intuitions of justice, will in-
evitably be widely seen as failing in a mission that the commu-
nity thinks important, or even foundational, unless the sys-
tem’s unjust operation can be hidden. Hiding injustice would be 
hard to do without breaching notions of press freedom and gov-
ernment transparency to which liberal democracies aspire. 
For a final example, it seems likely that any realistic 
criminal justice system or program for its reform must take 
into account the community’s shared intuitions of justice. This 
does not mean that law can never deviate from those intuitions 
or try to change them, but it must be realistic about what it can 
and cannot change and about the costs—financial and social—
that such changes may require. The greatest success in shaping 
the perceived wrongfulness of particular conduct may not be to 
fight people’s intuitions of justice but rather to try to harness 
them, by providing information or arguments that strengthen 
(or weaken) the analogy between the target conduct and the 
core wrongdoing on which people have strong intuitions. 
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APPENDIX A: TEXT OF STUDY 1 & 2 SCENARIOS; 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The scenarios are listed in the order predicted, with first four 
scenarios having no liability. 
SCENARIO 1: DEFENDING ATTACK 
John is knocked down from behind by a man with a knife who 
moves to stab him. As the man lunges for him, John stabs 
him with a piece of glass he finds on the ground, which is 
the only thing he can do to save himself from being killed. 
The man later dies of his injuries. 
SCENARIO 2: COERCIVE THREAT TO CHILD 
A man grabs John’s child and puts a sharp knife to her throat. 
He tells John that he will kill the child if John does not 
steal an expensive digital camera from a nearby shop or he 
attempts to contact police. Because the man can see every-
thing he does, John does as he is told in order to save his 
child.  
SCENARIO 3: UMBRELLA MISTAKE 
John takes another person’s umbrella assuming it to be his own 
because it is has the same unusual color pattern as his 
own, a fact that the police confirm.  
SCENARIO 4: HALLUCINATION 
Another person slips a drug into John’s food, which causes him 
to hallucinate that he is being attacked by a wolf. When 
John strikes out in defense, he does not realize that he is 
in fact striking a person, a fact confirmed by all of the psy-
chiatrists appointed by the state, who confirm that John 
had no ability to prevent the hallucination.  
SCENARIO 5: WHOLE PIES FROM BUFFET 
The owner has posted rules at his all-you-can-eat buffet that 
expressly prohibit taking food away; patrons can only take 
what they eat at the buffet. The owner has set the price of 
the buffet accordingly. John purchases dinner at the buf-
fet, but when he leaves he takes with him two whole pies 
to give to a friend.  
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SCENARIO 6: LOGO T-SHIRT FROM STORE 
John notices in a small family-owned music store a T-shirt with 
the logo of his favorite band. While the store clerk is preoc-
cupied with inventory, John places the $15 T-shirt in his 
coat and walks out, with no intention of paying for it. 
SCENARIO 7: SHORT CHANGE CHEAT 
John is a cab driver who picks up a high school student. Be-
cause the customer seems confused about the money trans-
action, John decides he can trick her and gives her $20 less 
change than he knows she is owed. 
SCENARIO 8: CLOCK RADIO FROM CAR 
As he is walking to a party in a friend’s neighborhood, John 
sees a clock radio on the backseat of a car parked on the 
street. Later that night, on his return from the party, he 
checks the car and finds it unlocked, so he takes the clock 
radio from the back seat.  
SCENARIO 9: ELECTRIC DRILL FROM GARAGE 
John does not have all the tools he needs for his workshop but 
knows of a family two streets over who sometimes leave 
unlocked the door to the detached garage next to their 
house. When he next sees his chance, he enters the de-
tached garage through the unlocked door and takes a me-
dium-size electric drill, intending to keep it forever. 
SCENARIO 10: MICROWAVE FROM HOUSE 
While a family is on vacation, John jimmies the back door to 
their house and steps into their kitchen. On the counter, 
he sees their microwave, which he carries away.  
SCENARIO 11: SMASHING TV 
While a family is away for the day, John breaks in through a 
bedroom widow and rummages through the house looking 
for valuables. He can only find an 18-inch television, which 
angers him. When he gets it outside, he realizes that it is 
an older model than he wants, so he smashes it onto the 
driveway, breaking it into pieces. 
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SCENARIO 12: SLAP & BRUISING AT RECORD STORE 
A record store patron is wearing a cap that mocks John’s favor-
ite band. John follows him from the store, confronts him, 
then slaps him in the face hard, causing him to stumble. 
The man’s face develops a harsh black and yellow bruise 
that does not go away for some time.  
SCENARIO 13: HEAD-BUTT AT STADIUM 
While attending a football game, John becomes angry as he 
overhears an opposing fan’s disparaging remarks about 
John’s team. At the end of the game, John sticks his face in 
the man’s face and head-butts him, causing a black eye 
and a gash that requires two stitches to close.  
SCENARIO 14: STITCHES AFTER SOCCER GAME 
Angry after overhearing another parent’s remarks during a 
soccer match in which John’s son is playing, John ap-
proaches the man after the game, grabs his coffee mug, 
knocks him down, then kicks him several times while he is 
on the ground, knocking him out for several minutes and 
causing cuts that require five stitches.  
SCENARIO 15: NECKLACE SNATCH AT MALL 
As a woman searches her purse for car keys in a mall parking 
lot, John runs up and grabs her gold necklace but it does 
not break. He yanks the woman to the ground by her neck-
lace, where she gashes her head, requiring stitches. John 
runs off without the necklace.  
SCENARIO 16: ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AT GAS STATION 
John demands money from a man buying gas at a gas station. 
When the man refuses, John punches the man several 
times in the face, breaking his jaw and causing several 
cuts that each require stitches. He then runs off without 
getting any money.  
SCENARIO 17: CLUBBING DURING ROBBERY 
To force a man to give up his wallet during a robbery attempt, 
John beats the man with a club until he relinquishes his 
wallet, which contains $350. The man must be hospitalized 
for two days. 
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SCENARIO 18: MAULING BY PIT BULLS 
Two vicious pit bulls that John keeps for illegal dog fighting 
have just learned to escape and have attacked a person 
who came to John’s house. The police tell John he must de-
stroy the dogs, which he agrees to do but does not intend to 
do. The next day, the dogs escape again and maul to death 
a man delivering a package.  
SCENARIO 19: INFANT DEATH IN CAR 
John is driving to see a man about buying an illegal gun but 
must baby-sit his friend’s toddler son. It occurs to him that 
it is too hot to safely leave the toddler in the car but he de-
cides to leave him anyway and to return soon. He gets 
talking with the seller, however, and forgets about the 
toddler, who passes out and dies.  
SCENARIO 20: STABBING 
John is offended by a woman’s mocking remark and decides to 
hurt her badly. At work the next day, when no one else is 
around, he picks up a letter opener from his desk and 
stabs her. She later dies from the wound.  
SCENARIO 21: AMBUSH SHOOTING 
John knows the address of a woman who has highly offended 
him. As he had planned the day before, he waits there for 
the woman to return from work and, when she appears, 
John shoots her to death.  
SCENARIO 22: ABDUCTION SHOOTING 
A woman at work reveals John’s misdeeds to his employer, 
thereby getting him fired. John devises a plan to get even 
with her. The next week he forces the woman into his car 
at knife point and drives her to a secluded area where he 
shoots her to death.  
SCENARIO 23: BURNING MOTHER FOR INHERITANCE 
John works out a plan to kill his 60-year-old invalid mother for 
the inheritance. He drags to her bed, puts her in, and 
lights her oxygen mask with a cigarette, hoping to make it 
look like an accident. The elderly woman screams as her 
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clothes catch fire and she burns to death. John just 
watches her burn.  
SCENARIO 24: RANSOM, RAPE, TORTURE & STRANGLING 
John kidnaps an 8 year-old girl for ransom, rapes her, then re-
cords the child’s screams as he burns her with a cigarette 
lighter, sending the recording to her parents to induce 
them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they pay as 
directed, John strangles the child to death to avoid leaving 
a witness.  
STUDY 1 & 3 ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES 
The instructions to participants read: 
  Imagine you are given complete discretion to punish (or not pun-
ish) John for his actions in each of the following scenarios. 
  On the table in front of you, carefully order the scenarios from the 
least amount of punishment that you think John deserves, to the 
most amount of punishment you think he deserves. You may order 
the cards either horizontally or vertically on the table, whichever you 
prefer. Set aside all those scenarios in which you would not punish 
John. Rank order all remaining scenarios; do not allow any ties. 
  Each scenario is independent of the others. Do not use details 
from one scenario in determining punishment for any other scenario. 
Base your answers solely on what you believe to be just, regardless of 
any laws. The only thing you should focus on is how much punish-
ment John deserves. Take as much time as you need to rank order the 
cards given to you. Remember to carefully read each scenario. After 
you complete the sorting, review your rankings to be sure they are as 
you want them to be. When you are finished with this task, notify the 
administrator and await further instructions. Leave the cards spread 
on the table. 
SPECIAL NOTE: Anyone who would like to do so may do the exercise 
again in 30 days and, if they produce the same ranking as they do to-
day, they will be paid $25.00. No one is obliged to do the exercise 
again. The administrator will provide a phone number to call for 
those who do want to do the exercise again. 
After participants had completed the task, they were given 
the following instructions as “Part 2” of the study: 
Review the ranking of the scenarios that you made in Part 1. This 
time, consider each scenario in relation to the scenario above it in 
terms of punishment deserved, and the scenario below it in terms of 
punishment deserved to see if you still agree with the rank order of 
each scenario in relation to the one ranked above and below. Make 
any adjustments to order that you feel are necessary to reflect the 
relative amount of punishment John deserves. Leave the cards spread 
on the table. 
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The administrator instructions were as follows: 
  Give the participant the brief description of the survey before they 
agree to take the survey. Give the test only when and where the par-
ticipant will have no interruptions or distractions and where there is 
a clear table large enough for 20 or more piles of cards. 
(1) Give the participant the Part 1 Instruction and the Part 1 
Scenario Cards. Ask them to tell you when they completed Part 1. 
Direct them to read and carefully follow the Part 1 Instructions 
and to take as much time as they need. Leave the person alone to 
sort the cards. You may check briefly to be sure they are doing 
the task as intended. They may arrange the cards either horizon-
tally or vertically, whichever they prefer. 
(2) When the person is finished with Part 1, quickly look over 
their Part 1 rankings. (This helps convince them that Part 2 
really is a new test that deserves their careful attention.) Then 
give them the instructions for Part 2 and leave them alone. 
(3) When the person is finished with Part 2, leave their cards as 
they placed them and give them the Part 3 Instructions and the 
Part 3 Scenario Cards. Instruct them to read and carefully follow 
the Part 3 Instructions and to take as much time as they need. 
Leave the person alone to sort and place the cards. You may 
check briefly to be sure they are doing the task as intended. 
(4) When the person has finished Part 3, ask them to complete 
the Demographics Questionnaire. Ask them to place the form in 
the “Demographics Forms” envelope when they are finished. 
(This helps avoid any awkwardness in having them hand the 
form with its personal information to you.) When they are fin-
ished, thank them for their help. 
(5) Have them fill out the Charities form, or pay them $10 and 
sign a cash receipt. 
(6) Record their responses on the Survey Response Form: Record 
their card rank ordering, including a horizontal line that distin-
guishes the no-liability cases. The rank of each Part 3 scenario 
should marked by a line drawn to even with or between two Part 
1 scenarios. 
  Record on the bottom of the demographic form whether the sub-
ject was from Urban, Suburban, or Rural. Record on the demographic 
form whether the person had been used in field testing 
  Separate the Part 1 and Part 3 cards. Shuffle each deck to get 
ready for the next participant. 
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  APPENDIX B: REASONS FOR PREDICTED RANKINGS OF 
STUDY 1 & 2 SCENARIOS   
 
SCENARIOS 1–4: NO LIABILITY 
Each of these scenarios presents a case of clear and compelling 
exculpation even though what John has done is normally 
prohibited. In scenario 1, the killing is necessary to defend 
against an unprovoked attempt to kill John, typically giv-
ing a complete justification. In scenario 2, the apparently 
inescapable threat to kill John’s child justifies, or at least 
excuses, his coerced theft. In scenario 3, the honest and 
non-culpable mistake undercuts the culpable state of mind 
normally a prerequisite for criminal liability. In scenario 4, 
the hallucination, which John did not culpably cause, 
means that John lacks the kind of moral functioning that 
typically is a prerequisite for criminal liability, and thus 
excuses him. 
SCENARIOS 5–11: THEFT AND INTRUSION 
Scenario 5, in which John takes two pies from an all-you-can-
eat buffet, was designed to be a borderline case. His con-
duct is technically in violation of the rules of the buffet but 
people could conclude that it is a violation insufficiently 
serious to merit the condemnation of criminal liability. The 
remaining scenarios in the series, 6 through 11, move 
along several continuums that appear to be important to 
people’s judgments about the extent of such wrongdoing. 
The value of the property taken increases steadily from a 
T-shirt through an electric drill to a television. The extent 
of intrusion used in the taking also increases steadily from 
a public place through a person’s unlocked car to rummag-
ing through a person’s house. 
SCENARIOS 12–14: INJURY 
In a fashion parallel to the technique used above, these injury 
scenarios 12 through 14 move along the continuums that 
people apparently use to judge the extent of wrongdoing in 
causing injury. The extent of the injury increases across 
the cases from a slap with brief bruising through a head-
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butt to severe kicks requiring stitches. The overall sense of 
hostility and aggression also increases over the series. 
SCENARIOS 15–17: ROBBERY 
These robbery cases, 15 through 17, are in essence a continua-
tion of the injury series above with the added wrongdoing 
of a forceful taking. Again, the extent of the injury in-
creases from a fall causing a gash through punches caus-
ing a broken jaw to a clubbing requiring hospitalization. 
(The value of the goods sought to be taken also increases 
through the series.) 
SCENARIOS 18 & 19: UNINTENTIONAL KILLINGS 
Cases 18 and 19 present instances of greater harms than the 
injury and robbery series above but are distinguishable 
from the cases in the next series because here John has no 
intention to cause the death. Level of culpable state of 
mind toward a result is seen as a powerful determinant of 
blameworthiness. The greater punishment is predicted for 
the infant death over the adult because of the more vul-
nerable victim, also a powerful determinant in many con-
texts. 
SCENARIOS 20–24: INTENTIONAL KILLINGS 
These cases of intentional killings, 20 through 24, move along a 
continuum of greater brutality and greater planning and 
calculation in the execution of the offense, together with 
more vulnerable victims at the extreme. 
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APPENDIX C: TEXT OF STUDY 3 & 4 SCENARIOS 
 
SCENARIO A: DRUNK DRIVING CRASH 
John stops by Earl’s Tavern on his way home from work, and 
drinks two of their infamous long island iced teas. Driving 
home he crashes his pickup into a telephone pole in his 
suburban subdivision, suffering only minor injuries. His 
blood alcohol content is twice the legal limit.  
SCENARIO B: PROSTITUTION 
The front desk clerk suspects Jane is a prostitute when she 
checks into the motel. After witnessing several different 
men enter and leave the motel room, he calls police, who 
arrive and witness Jane having sex for money. How much 
punishment does Jane deserve?  
SCENARIO C: MARIJUANA PURCHASE FOR USE 
John approaches a drug dealer and purchases enough mari-
juana to smoke six “bowls” for a party one Saturday night.  
SCENARIO D: ALCOHOL FOR TEEN PARTY 
John’s 15 year-old cousin is throwing a party for all of his high 
school friends. Because his cousin is too young to legally 
buy alcohol himself, John buys him 2 kegs and a half-
gallon of vodka, in violation of state law.  
SCENARIO E: BESTIALITY 
A local farmer wakes up in the middle of the night to strange 
noises coming from the barn. As he gets up to investigate, 
he discovers John having vigorous intercourse with one of 
the farmer’s sheep.  
SCENARIO F: LATE-TERM ABORTION 
John is a general practitioner who is asked by one of his long-
time patients to perform a late term abortion in the 7th 
month of pregnancy because she no longer wants the child. 
Although he knows such a late abortion is illegal, he per-
forms the procedure anyway.  
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SCENARIO G: COCAINE PURCHASE FOR USE 
John is picked up by the police after buying half a gram of 
powder cocaine on the corner of the street across the city 
from his home, enough for 6 “lines.”  
SCENARIO H: UNCONSENTED-TO INTERCOURSE 
During an intimate petting session with his girlfriend, John 
gets sexually excited and asks for sex. His girlfriend says 
no, and protests as he climbs on top of her. She lays stiffly, 
without moving, and she tells him to stop, but he does not.  
SCENARIO I: JEWELRY GRAB THIRD CONVICTION 
John asks to examine a diamond engagement ring at a store, 
then quickly runs off with it, but is caught. John has two 
previous convictions for which he served jail time, one for 
stealing a car and the other for starting a fist fight with 
another man. 
SCENARIO J: ASSAULT & FORCIBLE INTERCOURSE 
John hides in the bushes near a burned out street lamp in a 
mall parking lot. When a mall employee returns to her car 
after work John drags her back into the bushes and rapes 
her.  
SCENARIO K: DRUG DEALER 
John earns a lot of money as one of the only drug dealers in 
town, selling cocaine to anyone who will buy. Police raid 
his expensive apartment, and find 500 grams of powder co-
caine under his basement, enough for around 6,000 “lines.”  
SCENARIO L: COCAINE IMPORTER/DISTRIBUTOR 
John is a big time cocaine importer and distributor who lives in 
a beautiful mansion and directs the work of a dozen deal-
ers. The police raid his home and find five kilograms of 
powder cocaine, enough for 60,000 “lines” of cocaine.  
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLES OF STATUTORY MAXIMUMS 
FOR STUDY 3 & 4 SCENARIOS 
 
DRUNK DRIVING CRASH 
625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-501(b-2) (West 2006) (codifying 
the offense as an Illinois Class A Misdemeanor); id. at 
5/11-501(b-3) (providing a mandatory minimum of 5 days 
imprisonment or 240 hours of community service for any 
second conviction). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a)(5) (2003) (providing offense); id. 
§ 40-6-391(c)(1)(A)–(C) (providing punishment comprising 
a fine of $300–$1000, jail time of 10 days to 12 months, 
and community service of 40 hours). 
PROSTITUTION 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14(b) (West 2006) (codifying the 
offense as an Illinois Class A Misdemeanor), declared un-
constitutional by People v. Lindsey, 753 N.E.2d 1270 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001).  
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-9 (2003) (providing offense); id. § 16-6-
13(a) (codifying the offense as a misdemeanor). 
MARIJUANA PURCHASE FOR USE 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(17) (2006) 
(assigning Level 6 for less than 250 grams). 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 550/4(a) (West 2006) (classifying the 
offense as an Illinois Class C Misdemeanor for not more 
than 2.5 grams). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2003) (providing offense); id. 
§ 16-13-30(j)(2) (prescribing felony sentence of 1–10 years). 
ALCOHOL FOR TEEN PARTY 
235 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-16(a) (West 2006) (codifying the 
offense as an Illinois Class A Misdemeanor), declared un-
constitutional by People v. Law, 782 N.E.2d 247 (Ill. 2002); 
id. (providing punishment as a fine not less than $500). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23(a)(1)–(4) (2003) (providing offense); id. 
§ 3-3-23.1(b)(1) (codifying the offense as a misdemeanor). 
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BESTIALITY 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-35(e) (West 2006) (codifying the 
offense as an Illinois Class 4 Felony). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-6(b) (2003) (providing punishment as 1–5 
years imprisonment). 
LATE-TERM ABORTION 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/10 (West 2006) (codifying the of-
fense as an Illinois Class 4 Felony), declared unconstitu-
tional by Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 
1998). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140 (2003) (providing punishment of  
1–10 years imprisonment). 
COCAINE PURCHASE FOR USE 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(14) (2006) 
(assigning Level 12 for less than 25 grams). 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/402(a) (West 2006) (codifying 
the offense as an Illinois Class 1 Felony); id. at 
570/402(a)(2)(A) (providing punishment as 4–15 years im-
prisonment with respect to 15–100 grams). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(c) (2003) (providing a first offense 
sentence of 2–15 years imprisonment; a second offense sen-
tence of 5–30 years imprisonment). 
UNCONSENTED-TO INTERCOURSE 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13(b)(1) (West 2006) (codifying 
the offense as an Illinois Class 1 Felony Criminal Sexual 
Assault). It is unclear, however, whether the situation as 
depicted in the scenario would be a crime under the Illinois 
Code, as John did not “commit[] an act of sexual penetra-
tion by the use of force or threat of force.” Id. at 5/12-
13(a)(1) (emphasis added). There was no consent, but be-
cause John’s girlfriend “lay[] stiffly, without moving,” it is 
unclear that liability would be assigned. See supra Appen-
dix C (Scenario H). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (2003) (providing offense when “car-
nal knowledge” is acquired “forcibly and against her will”); 
id. § 16-6-1(b) (providing offender “shall be punished by 
death, by imprisonment for life without parole, by impris-
onment for life, or by . . . a term of imprisonment for not 
less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment”). 
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In Georgia, the offense of rape requires more than 
non-consensual sex; it requires the element of force. Perry 
v. State, 588 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). If the 
State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that an al-
leged rape victim’s lack of outward or physical resistance 
resulted from her apprehension of bodily harm, violence, or 
other dangerous consequences to herself or another, that 
lack of resistance will not constitute “freely given consent.” 
Clark v. State, 404 S.E.2d 787, 788 (Ga. 1991). “Force, as 
an element of rape, need not be proven by evidence of 
physical violence; evidence of a victim’s lack of resistance 
induced by fear authorizes a finding of force.” In re J.W.L., 
531 S.E.2d 169, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). It is unclear 
whether the force element would be met here because it is 
unclear that the victim’s lack of resistance was induced by 
fear. See supra Appendix C (Scenario H). 
JEWELRY GRAB THIRD CONVICTION 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-1(b)(2) (West 2006) (providing 
that theft of property from the person not exceeding $300 
in value, or theft of property exceeding $300 and not ex-
ceeding $10,000 in value, is an Illinois Class 3 Felony).  
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-40(a)(3) (2003) (providing a robbery of-
fense for “sudden snatching”); id. § 16-8-40(b) (providing a 
sentence of 1–20 years imprisonment); id. § 17-10-7(a) 
(providing that for a second felony conviction the sentence 
is presumptively the maximum time in the underlying of-
fense). 
ASSAULT & FORCIBLE INTERCOURSE 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13(b)(1) (West 2006) (codifying 
the offense as an Illinois Class 1 Felony Criminal Sexual 
Assault). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (2003) (providing an offense when 
“carnal knowledge” is acquired “forcibly and against her 
will”); id. § 16-6-1(b) (providing that the offender “shall be 
punished by death, by imprisonment for life without pa-
role, by imprisonment for life, or by . . . imprisonment for 
not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprison-
ment”). 
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DRUG DEALER 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/401(a) (West 2006) (codifying the of-
fense as an Illinois Class X Felony); id. at 570/401(a)(2)(C) 
(providing punishment as 12–50 years imprisonment with 
respect to 400–900 grams of a substance containing co-
caine). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31(a)(1) (2003) (providing for a mini-
mum sentence of 25 years imprisonment and a fine of $1 
million for “knowingly sell[ing]” or being “knowingly in 
possession of” greater than 400 grams of cocaine). 
COCAINE IMPORTER/DISTRIBUTOR 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2006) (as-
signing Level 32 for 5–15 kilograms). 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2006) (pro-
viding punishment as 15–60 years imprisonment for 900 
grams or more). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31(a)(1) (2003) (providing for a mini-
mum sentence of 25 years and a fine of $1 million for 
“knowingly sell[ing]” or being “knowingly in possession of” 
greater than 400 grams of cocaine). 
